The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative : a case study in community-controlled planning by Nagel, Andrea Isabel
THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE:






Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies & Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master in City Planning
at the
Massachussetts Institute of Technology
May 1990
Andrea Isabel Nagel
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author










To the people of the Dudley neighborhood,








II. SHORT HISTORY OF ROXBURY.......................
III. THE'DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD
A CASE STUDY...................
INITIATIVE:




I. MAP OF THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD
BOUNDARIES....................................-
II. DISTRIBUTION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF DSNI.....










During the research and writing of this thesis, I have
been helped greatly by many people.
I especially thank my advisor, Lisa Peattie, for
combining her unfailing support with a constant maintenance
of high standards. I also thank her, as well as Judith
Tendler, Edwin Melendez, Mel King and Shlomo Angel, for
prompting me to think in liberating ways and to ask the most
meaningful questions. My thanks also go to my readers Phil
Clay and Yale Rabin, who gave important criticisms of
earlier drafts of this paper.
I thank my soulmates Bonnie Wolf and Frances
Washington-Ferguson whose resolute friendship, love and
faith embody the essence of sisterhood.
I also thank my brother Alexander, whose wisdom,
tenacity and encouragement enabled me to overcome important
obstacles in this personal and academic journey. I also
thank my mother, my father, Marta Hallett and my brother
Pablo for their continual support.
I also thank MCP Coordinator Mary Grenham, whose
unwavering assistance made the completion of this thesis
possible.
Finally, I am very grateful to past and present staff
members of DSNI Peter Medoff, Gus Newport, Ros Everdell,
Gertrudes Fidalgo and Richard, as well as the Board of DSNI,
for generously sharing their knowledge and experience
throughout this process.
THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE:
A CASE STUDY IN COMMUNITY-CONTROLLED PLANNING
by
Andrea Isabel Nagel
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning on May 25, 1990
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
Degree of Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
The combined effects of decades of disinvestment, redlining
and other discriminatory practices, both public and private,
created deteriorated conditions in most areas of Roxbury,
and in particular the Dudley neighborhood. In more recent
days, during Boston's downtown renaissance in the early
1980s, the Dudley neighborhood began to feel the added
threat of a strong wave of gentrification. Its effort to
organize in response to the totality of these problems is
the subject of this thesis.
The culmination of this effort has taken shape in the form
of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI). This
thesis is above all a case study of the evolution of this
organization in the life of the neighborhood. Since its
inception, DSNI has been held up as a model for community
development efforts. This thesis seeks to describe its
approach to development, and to understand this approach --
and the changes it underwent -- in the light of the history
of the neighborhood and the community.
Thesis Supervisor: Lisa R. Peattie
Title: Professor Emeritus of Urban Anthropology
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Recent attention has been directed to the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), a neighborhood-based
organization in the Dudley area of Roxbury. Planners,
community groups, policy makers, politicians, and funders
alike have increasingly taken note of DSNI, perhaps because
it recently obtained eminent domain designation from the
Boston Redevelopment Authority. Indeed, conveyance of such
power from a municipal authority to a local non-profit
community group is unprecedented and therefore notable.
Although these events raise the questions of why and how, a
broader and more interesting set of issues also arises.
Assuming for a moment that acquiring eminent domain -does
form part of a larger neighborhood revitalization strategy,
as claimed by DSNI, then what is that overarching strategy?
How does an urban neighborhood which is poor, segregated,
disinvested and comprised mostly of people of color, like
Dudley, revitalize itself? And, subsequently, how is this
process institutionalized?
The present thesis will analyze the process by which
the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative has approached the
task of rebuilding the Dudley neighborhood, both in physical
and human terms, during the past five years since its
inception. DSNI offers the possibility for an interesting
case study of an indigenous neighborhood-based planning and
revitalization effort grounded in organizing. Although DSNI
emerges as a "model" of neighborhood renewal, providing
important lessons for community developers, the process is
still evolving and the full extent of its consequences has
not yet been realized. Gus Newport, the executive director
of DSNI and former mayor of Berkeley, California, has
himself said that "what is being done in Dudley has never
been done before... it is an experiment with which we are
proceeding very cautiously."
In this chapter I will describe the components which
make up DSNI as an organization. This initial chapter lays
the framework for the analysis of the DSNI revitalization
effort which follows in the next chapters. I will provide a
backdrop of neighborhood development efforts which stem from
the public sector, the private sector and the non-profit
development sector in order to better understand the course
being charted by DSNI. I will also take the opportunity in
this chapter to define terms and concepts that run
throughout the analysis.
In chapter two, I will provide an abridged history of
Roxbury. The second chapter will briefly discuss the
development and economic history of the Roxbury
neighborhood, in order to provide the context for
appreciating the problems that face Roxbury and Dudley
today. The third chapter will examine the organizing,
planning and implementation efforts which constitute DSNI's
program for neighborhood revitalization. The fourth chapter
will assess the tensions encountered and created by the
programs of DSNI. Finally, remarks of a more general nature
are made in chapter five.
1. THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative is a
coalition of local residents, agencies, churches, and
businesses which banded together in 1984 to plan for the
future of the racially and ethnically diverse Dudley
neighborhood and to organize residents to advocate on their
own behalf. DSNI has grown in its membership from 400+ to
over 1000 since it was created in 1984. The Board of 31 is
comprised of elected representatives of the four groups
mentioned above. After residents initially contested their
relative representation vis-a-vis the other groups on the
Board, they increased their size to 51% of the Board. This
initial struggle for resident control of the Board set the
tone for the direction the planning process would take.
The nine month planning process culminated with the
formulation of "The DSNI Revitalization Plan: A
Comprehensive Community Controlled Strategy" in September of
1987. The plan was comprehensive in that it incorporated
residents' ideas, in their order of priority, regarding not
only physical development but also human and economic
development. DSNI is now phasing in implemention of the
plan. DSNI as an organization is founded on the belief that
to revitalize Dudley in a manner that benefits current
residents, the effort necessarily requires their
participation, and more importantly their direction. The
position of people involved with DSNI is that Dudley's
future will depend as much on their organized power to shape
the course of development as it will on other factors that
loom overhead -- the City's cooperation, the State's fiscal
situation and the market among others. DSNI members feel
that it is they who will ultimately carry this plan to
fruition, with needed institutional support along the way.
Nevertheless, DSNI's efforts to turn the tide of
disinvestment and abandonment and rebuild its community,
give a clear idea of the difficult issues facing the
community group. How is the planning process community
controlled? How does DSNI incorporate the community
residents in making complex planning and development
decisions? Are residents empowered in this process? How
does DSNI maintain a balance between the physical and the
human development aspects of the plan? How does DSNI manage
both to confront and to cooperate with the powers that be?
How does DSNI carry out planning and development with the
limited resources of a small non-profit? These are but some
of the difficult problems which DSNI has grappled with in
the past and continues to face in the present.
It is necessary at this point to clarify the concept of
neighborhood and its importance as a social, political, and
economic base.
2. THE CONCEPT OF NEIGHBORHOOD
In their Neighborhood Organizer's Handbook, Warren and
Warren note that:
beyond the family, the neighborhood is the most
universal base of social life to be found in any
society... (because it) is a critical intersecting point
between often isolated individuals and the mass
society. This integrating role is... first via the
sense of belonging and community which many
neighborhoods provide and, second, via the more
utilitarian helping and problem-solving resources which
residents in a given neighborhood possess. I
Warren and Warren hold that it is the "adaptive
capacity" of neighborhoods that is critical to their being
able to absorb the "shocks of larger society".
Neighborhoods accomplish this through the social networks
that provide the web of coping resources. Berger and Neuhaus
maintain that neighborhoods are key "mediating structures"
between the individual and the larger societal institutions
because they are "the value-laden and value-maintaining
£ Rachelle Warren and Donald Warren, The Neighborhood
Organizer's Handbook (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press,
1977), p.197.
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agencies in society ...the people-sized instituions."
Among the many important functions that Warren and
Warren outline for neighborhoods is that of "status area".
Whereas status is often achieved through materialistic
displays in more affluent areas, poorer neighborhoods may
make status claims that actually supplant those valued by
larger society.' Their research in Detroit also suggests
that, generally, the neighborhood is of greater significance
as a social base for blacks than for whites. They
determined that black neighborhoods often assume a greater
variety of functions for its residents than white
neighborhoods do. One explanation given for this is that
since low-income people, particularly blacks, are limited in
their mobility, they are necessarily more reliant on their
immediate neighborhood than whites. Factors like race,
ethnicity and income do determine the demands that are made
of a neighborhood by its residents.
Different neighborhood planning and development
strategies have traditionallly treated the "neighborhood" in
only one of its various dimensions: as a network of social
relations, as an architectural and structural setting, as a
locus of political activity, etc.. As we will see, these
* Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People:
The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1977),
p.7.
* Warren and Warren, p.24.
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strategies rarely adopted a more complex, holistic
understanding of the neighborhood as the ground for
planning. What follows is a discussion of these past
approaches to planning at the neighborhood level.
3. NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING APPROACHES
Rohe and Gates identify three periods in the history of
neighborhood planning, each of which addresses neighborhood
problems in a distinct way.' The authors describe these as:
the settlement house approach, the neighborhood unit
approach and the community action approach. Over time, the
role of citizens increased progressively and the concept of
neighborhood changed as programs developed over time.
The Settlement House Approach
According to Rohe and Gates, the settlement approach
viewed the neighborhood as a locus of social relations
characterized by similar class and racial/ethnic
composition. This movement has its roots in England, where
the Industrial Revolution brought on the urban consequences
of industrialization. People applied their newfound belief
in science to their sense of justice and began to work at
the neighborhood level. They focused on the individual, the
family and the neighborhood to address the issues of urban
poverty. This idea spread throughout the northeast of the
f Ibid., pp. 13 and sqq.
U.S. in the latter part of the nineteenth century and
resulted in the creation of The National Federation of
Settlements in 1911.
One-hundred and thirty settlement houses had been
established by 1930. While at first the settlement houses
promoted activities centered around cultural and
intellectual pursuits, they quickly engaged themselves with
the problems of local residents, like working conditions.
Settlement activists determined that the problem of the poor
and immigrant communities stemmed from their lack of
integration into mainstream middle-class culture.
Settlement houses, therefore, sought to help assimilate
immigrants and to strengthen families and neighborhoods.'
The settlement house movement was steeped in the
philosophies of Christianity, democracy and science. The
movement espoused ideals of brotherhood, belief in
democratic institutions and empirical analysis, all of which
shaped the programmatic approaches developed.' The
settlement houses relied on private funding, thus
maintaining financial independence of public dollars. Among
the major shortcomings of this movement are its focus on the
individual and an uncritical analysis of the institutional
* Ibid., p.16.
* Ibid., p.18.
factors leading to poverty. Whereas the settlement house
approach focused mostly on the social aspect of
neighborhood, the neighborhood unit approach focused on its
physical aspects.
The Neighborhood Unit Approach
The neighborhood unit approach developed more or less
concurrently as the settlement house movement, yet its focus
was quite different. According to that approach,
intervention was thought to be most meaningful at the
physical level of the neighborhood. In the thirties,
recognizing the need for fomenting social interaction and
political participation in face of sprawling urban
development, Clarence Perry put forth his idea of a
neighborhood unit. Perry believed that the built
environment was at the root of the problem.
As the solution to urban physical, social and
political ills, he proposed the creation of planned
neighborhoods, which would be based around an elementary
school and have common recreational and commercial space.
He layed out "six principles of neighborhood design,"
founded on the belief that physical surroundings engender
social behavior. This lead to the charge that this
perspective actually fostered physical determinism and
segregation. Nontheless, the neighborhood unit persists as
an important planning model, especially for new residential
development.' This approach, though, did not impact urban
neighborhoods as intended. The community action approach,
with a focus on the neighborhood as a political entity, had
direct effects on urban areas.
The Community Action Approach
The era of the 40's and 50's ascribed new roles to
planning and government. As a result of the Depression and
World War II, the central government assumed ever greater
responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. The
welfare state was consolidating. Planning, which broadened
its purview, became more comprehensive. While post-war
industrialization caused the accelerated growth of cities
and their surroundings, it aggravated inner-city conditions
-- already worsened by underinvestment dating back to the
1920's." The federal government ushered in a response to
this situation with legislation, the Housing Act of 1949,
enabling municipalities to undertake "redevelopment"
programs. Title I of this Act allocated one billion dollars
in loans and 500 million dollars in grants to clear inner
city "slums." Sternlieb and Listokin state that the 1949
Ibid., p.30.
* George Sternlieb and David Listokin, Review of Past
Policies and Assumptions: What Worked and What Didn't, Paper
presented at the Lavenburg Housing Conference, Rutgers
University, March 17, 1983, p.13.
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Act was, in part, a reply to the concerns of downtown and
real estate entrepreneurs, who were becoming distraught with
the conditions of the inner city. "The economic centrality
of major cities and their basic vigor was viewed as
unimpaired. All that was required was cosmetic clean-up --
sometimes viewed as moving the poor -- and increasingly the
blacks -- to less obtrusive locations."
Cities made clear choices favoring their downtowns as
opposed to their neighborhoods in their resource allocation
decisions. Cities supplied private entrepreneurs with
subsidized land (that had been acquired through eminent
domain), tax benefits and development opportunities in order
to build luxury housing, hotels, and, commercial, industrial
and public facilities."* City officials and their private
sector counterparts believed that downtown investment would
trigger the resurgence of the central city. Such activity
would attract commercial and business interests, create jobs
and lure back the suburbanized middle-class.
Although the Housing Act of 1954 presented
modifications for the renewal programs, these were not
implemented. Changes included rehabilitating rather than
eliminating housing, relocating rather than removing
residents, involving rather than alienating residents from
P Ibid.
*o Phillip Clay, Neighborhood Renewal (Lexington, MA:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1979), p. 73.
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program activities and setting rather than obviating a
minimum housing code standard."
By the early 1960's, new federal efforts surfaced for
addressing the issues confronting inner cities. "Urban
Removal" had clearly failed to eradicate poverty through the
eradication of whole neighborhoods. The seeds had been sown
for strategies that included citizens and broadened the
avenues of intervention.
Two important programs were initiated in the 1960's
which emphasized a comprehensive and participatory approach
for addressing urban problems. The Community Action Program
(CAP) was created under the Equal Opportunity Act in 1964
and the Model Cities Program under the Demonstration Cities
and Metropolitan Development Act in 1966. The Community
Action Program was administered through independent agencies
at the municipal level which developed their own programs to
confront poverty. Two salient aspects of this program were
its focus on citizen participation in planning and on
capacity building within the neighborhood. Organizing
activities became so widespread that the legislation was
eventually changed to have cities control the CAP agencies.
Then in 1971, Nixon eliminated the Office of Equal
Opportunity, which oversaw the Community Action Program,
leaving the activities of the latter dispersed among
Rohe and Gates, p.34.
different federal agencies, but not eliminated altogether."
The Model Cities Program, overseen by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, provided federal funds for
the local planning, development and implemention of
comprehensive plans for revitalizing "neighborhoods of slum
and blighted areas".. Model Cities agencies -- which
functioned out of city hall -- disbursed Model Cities funds
as well as those of other federal programs in place at the
time. The program also proposed to demonstrate marked
changes in targeted neighborhoods; complement local
municipal policies; address physical and social needs;
reduce the need for citizen participation.
In 1974, new legislation structurally changed the
channels for funding community development efforts. Title I
of the Housing Act replaced the programmatic approach of
earlier legislation with the Community Development Block
Grant disbursal of funding. This program continued to fund
Model Cities agencies and they were able to continue their
activities.
DSNI's approach, in many ways a departure from the
approaches just discussed, will be studied in chapter three.
Before embarking on the case study, however, it is necessary
to survey some important episodes in the history of Roxbury,
which is the topic of my next chapter.
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CHAPTER II: HISTORY OF ROXBURY
In the first part of this chapter, an overview of
Boston's history since the postwar period provides a context
for understanding many of the problems and issues facing the
Roxbury community today. The discussion outlines the major
impacts of federal policies, the changes in the economy,
demographic shifts and the persistence of discriminatory
practices on Boston's black community during the 1950's,
60's and 70's. I attempt to furnish a political-economic
framework for understanding imbalanced development in
Roxbury.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the more
recent political and development history of Roxbury, that of
the 1980's. The discusssion will culminate in an account of
the specific conditions leading to the creation of DSNI.
1. DEVELOPMENT HISTORY
Throughout the 50's and 60's, public sector initiatives
poured federal dollars into major cities across the country.
Attention focused on construction of inner city
transportation infrastructure to attract suburban
professionals into the city; renewing the physical
environment of the inner city by developing the downtown and
replacing "slum" neighborhoods with isolated new middle-
class ones through the Urban Renewal Program after 1949; and
addressing comprehensively the range of issues affecting
poverty-afflicted urban areas, through the Model Cities
Program after 1966. During the fifties and sixties,
public federal funds flowed into Boston through Urban
Renewal and underwrote much of downtown private industrial
and commercial development. The intent was "to assemble
enough land for private industry to build efficient, modern
structures"'", in view of the fact that industry would not
profit if it had to buy large downtown parcels in addition
to developing them. According to the Chamber of Commerce,
"this undertaking is proof that renewal can serve as a
vehicle for private ... development ... The classic
partnership of city officials and private interests aimed at
improving the economic base of the city."" The public role
was to vouch for the supposed public interests of the
project and to put forth the subsidies. In this manner, the
municipality was able to clear land on terms that were
advantageous to private developers."*
The "New York Streets" neighborhood of the South End
was the first project area slated for renewal in Boston and
. Boston Renewal (Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce,
Jan. 1964), in Mel King, Chain of Change, Struggles for Black
Community Development (Boston: South End Press, 1981), pp. 21-
22.
Ibid, p.25.
. Pierre Clavel, The Progressive City: Planning and
Participation, 1969 - 1984 (New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Press),
1986.
subsequently earned the status of "national model" for an
urban renewal initiative. Named after cities in New York
state with names of Native American nations, New York
Streets was strategically located for light industry and
commercial development, given its proximity to major
thoroughfares. A diverse neighborhood -- inhabited mainly by
Blacks and also Irish, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, Albanians,
Greeks, Lithuanians, Armenians, Jews, Filipinos and Chinese
-- New York Streets was razed in 1953. In diaspora fashion,
residents fled throughout Boston, mostly along color lines.
Whereas most white families moved to South Boston,
Dorchester and Jamaica Plain, most Black families went to
Washington Park, Lower Roxbury and North Dorchester."L
The next location to suffer eradication was the West
End, predominantly a Jewish and Italian neighborhood.
Charles River Park, high-rise, expensive, garden apartments,
now tower in its stead.
Then in 1960, the Boston Redevelopment Authority was
established to execute the dual functions of planning and
redevelopment for the City, as recommended by the Chamber of
Commerce. The objectives of Urban Renewal were, from that
point onward, faithfully carried out by the Boston
Redevelopment Authority. By the late 1970's, Boston had
reaped the benefits of "professionalized management under a
21
i' . Ibid.,
series of pro-development mayors,"'' and a centralized
planning/development body -- downtown Boston had blossomed.
The 1948 Plan of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for
highway development included, among other elements, the
Southwest Corridor Project (SWCP). The plan aimed to extend
Interstate 95 through Roxbury. Initial demolition leveled
homes and businesses along a wide path, extending from Lower
Roxbury through Roxbury to Jamaica Plain. People who lost
their homes were compensated by the state, but not
sufficiently to be able to purchase new homes in these
areas. And when they sought home loans, they found banks
and insurance companies decidedly against making loans in
these neighborhoods.
In addition to homes, outmoded industrial plants that
lined the Penn Central Railroad tracks were also demolished
as part of the Southwest Corridor Project. Although the
plants were out of use, the owners were also remunerated,
enabling them to relocate.** By the early 1960's, however,
a massive multi-racial and multi-class coalition formed to
oppose continued destruction of inner city neighborhoods.
37 Mauricio Gaston and Marie Kennedy, "Capital
Investment or Community Devlepment? The Struggle for Control
of Turf by Boston's Black and Latino Community", Boston,
UMASS, August 1986.
le Gaston, Mauricio, "Community Participation in
Boston's Southwest Corridor Project", MIT Thesis, 1981, in
Draft version of "From Disinvestment to Displacement: The
Redevelopment of Boston's Roxbury as a Case Study of Inner
City Communities of Color", Gaston and Kennedy, UMASS, Boston,
1986.
In 1970, the coalition halted then Governor Sargent from
further implementating the Southwest Corridor Project.
Demographically, Roxbury emerged as the heart of the
black community by the late 50's. Displaced from the South
End, Blacks were now concentrated in Roxbury and North
Dorchester. Whites fled increasingly to the outskirts of
the City, following the new jobs and in search of "the
American dream" of private homeownership, homogeneous white
communities and responsive school systems. The suburbs
prospered, providing the labor market for growing suburban
industries. However, Blacks in the inner city were excluded
from the jobs and housing found in the suburbs. Blacks,
along with immigrant workers, had only unskilled and service
sector jobs available to them, as these were the only ones
offered by remaining industries."*
2. ECONOMIC AND POLTICAL HISTORY
After World War II, Boston's economy began to shift
from an industrial, manufacturing and trade post to a
financial and high-technology research and development
center. These economic shifts emanating from the private
sector changed the nature of the City of Boston. Structural
changes in the economy severely affected the Boston's Black
community in the decades of the 50's, 60's and 70's. The
50's marked the regeneration of the state's economy with the
Ibid.
creation of the outlying high technology belt, Route 128.
The local university research base spawned commercial and
industrial opportunities and growth which, in turn, created
suburban residential growth. The high technology industry
propelled Boston out of a declining economic climate brought
on by the exodus of both manufacturing industries and
capital.
While professional jobs increased outside of the City,
Gaston and Kennedy point out that Boston lost 45% of its
manufacturing jobs and 61% of its wholesale and retail trade
jobs bewteen 1947 and 1975.2" The number of Black workers
increased in Roxbury, through in-migration from the South,
while job opportunities dwindled. These losses were
"accompanied by falling municipal revenues, declining city
services, deteriorating building stock and infrastructure,
and other signs of the urban crisis.""
Decaying city conditions affected Roxbury
disproportionately. During this general time period,
between 1950 and 1980, Roxbury experienced a net loss of 57%
in its general population."" With white flight came general
disinvestment, by both public and private interests.
Instead of replacing "blighted" housing, Urban Renewal
0 Ibid.
" Gaston and Kennedy, 1986.
"2 Roxbury Technical Assistance Project, 1986 in Gaston
and Kennedy, 1986.
eradicated housing and industry altogether in Madison Park
and Washington Park, for example." Madison Park, which
was the residential heart of Lower Roxbury, was cleared for
the construction of a new high school. Washington Park, the
most substantial of urban renewal efforts ventured in
Roxbury, lost 35% of its housing stock and witnessed
considerable displacement. Although some homes were
rehabilitated or newly constructed, many efforts were never
completed.
In addition, redlining and arson related activity
greatly worsened conditions for Roxbury residents --
homeowners, would-be homeowners and renters alike.
Discriminatory redlining practices denied owners home
improvement loans to make badly needed repairs on a maturing
housing stock, much of which dated back to the early 1900's.
This led many to abandon their homes entirely, even in cases
where they had already paid off their mortgages.
Redlining also denied would-be homeowners mortgages as
banks worried about the equity considerations of properties
located in Roxbury. Additionally, tenants were often in
precarious situations with absentee landlords. Many such
owners exhorted high rents, did not invest back into upkeep
of the units and eventually burned their buildings for
insurance collection purposes. Abandoned as well as burned
"" Gaston and Kennedy, 1986.
out homes were eventually torn down, leaving in their wake
vacant land throughout Roxbury.
With respect to the political development of the Black
community, geo-political problems in the electoral processes
governing School Committee and City Council elections
hindered the success of black candidates. In 1940, City
Council elections were by district, enabling the first black
to be elected, although his election required a court order
to be seated." Shortly thereafter, the electoral process
was changed to at-large district seats. This resulted in
subordinating the black vote to the majority white vote,
making it very difficult to get Black representatives
elected.
The previous discussion does not touch upon the
struggles waged to desegregate the Boston school system.
This important chapter in local and national history is but
another example of "disinvestment" in human terms rather
than in physical terms. Although this thesis cannot
accomodate a thorough discussion of this aspect, let this
not minimize its importance.
Even from this superficial and brief history it is
clear that the combination of misguided public programs,
public and private disinvestment and discriminatory
practices by the private sector, among other factors, have
jointly and systematically marginalized Roxbury increasingly
e** King, 1981, p.83
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over time -- economically, politically and socially. Public
funds facilitated the transfer of resources, services,
quality education and jobs away from Roxbury to the suburbs
and later to the revitalized areas of the City.
Having to fend for itself, the Black community of
Roxbury has sought a variety of ways to address its housing,
labor, social service needs. The next section discusses
some of the recent strategies developed. The discussion
relate each of these to DSNI's efforts.
3. RECENT POLITICAL CLIMATE IN ROXBURY
The recent political climate in both the city of Boston
and in the Roxbury neighborhood provided, in many ways, a
favorable set of circumstances for the successful creation
and development of DSNI. Raymond Flynn, whose neighborhood
commitment won him the Mayor's seat in 1983, was to mark a
change in the way City Hall addressed the needs of Boston
residents. The "neighborhood Mayor" issued a series of new
programs geared towards establishing a kindred spirit with
the neighborhoods. Boston's neighborhoods, ruled for 14
years by the highly-centralized administration of Kevin
White, had been peripheralized from the core of power at
City Hall. The machine had benefitted some, but not the
majority of Boston's residents. Flynn's administration,
with promises of opening up City Hall to Boston's citizens,
unleashed a flurry of activity at the local level. People
demands were finally falling on seemingly "friendly ears".
A year or so into Flynn's tenure, The Boston Globe
leaked the BRA's Dudley Square Plan. The $750 million plan
proposed to revitalize the Dudley Square area with the
construction of new office and retail space, the
rehabilitation of local public housing into cooperatives and
the development of large vacant parcels into moderate and
market rate housing units. The plan stated that:
(It) was prepared by the planning department of BRA as
a statement of its goals for the redevelopment of
the Dudley neighborhood. The plan set off a debate
about the nature of redevelopment, citizen
participation and empowerment and the role of
developers versus citizens in rebuilding urban
communities. The plan has no official status and the
BRA has undertaken to repair some of the fallout from
the release of the report.""
The "fallout" was the public outcry by Roxbury
residents to this redevelopment plan, which was seen by many
residents as an expansionist, gentrifying and illegitimate.
First, outspoken members and longtime Afro-American
activists of the Roxbury community came together as the
leadership in the Organizing Committee of the Greater
Roxbury Neighborhood Authority (OCGRNA) to oppose the
formulation and implementation of the plan. They argued
that rather than extend to Roxbury the benefits of Boston's
boom, the BRA plan actually represented Roxbury's bust. The
plan advocated moderate and market rate housing, while
"".The Dudley Square Plan: A Strategv for Neighborhood
Revitalization (Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority,
December 1984), cover page.
lacking provisions for maintaining and creating more
affordable units.
Second, the OCGRNA challenged the formulation of a plan
for the Black community without having carried out a proper
public process. Stephen Coyle, Flynn's newly appointed
director at the BRA, reportedly received community input
through contact with minority developers. The OCGRNA took
issue with the notion that the minority developers were
considered representative of the sentiment of the greater
Roxbury community. Roxbury residents and black for-profit
developers had come down on different sides of the fence on
several prior occasions and this one proved to be another
case in point.
Efforts to "repair some of the fallout from the release
of the report" included Coyle's proposition to create a
Project Area Committee (PAC), which the Mayor would appoint
and entrust with project review power. Calling for nothing
less than veto power over development decisions in Roxbury,
the OCGRNA elected its own overseeing body: the Interim
PAC. The Mayor subsequently recognized and incorporated the
elected members into the Roxbury PAC. Then, at a large
Roxbury town meeting, Flynn agreed that the Roxbury PAC be
vested with veto power. He later reneged on this promise,
which led the OCGRNA to file a suit against the City.
In effect, this action made it very difficult for the
BRA to carry out further development plans in Roxbury. The
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lawsuit challenged the BRA's standing to pursue renewal-type
development since Roxbury had not been designated as a
renewal area. This brought with it a series of obligations
to community participation in the decision-making process."
As a result, the BRA lay low in the Roxbury neighborhood and
concentrated on obtaining community participation in the
rezoning process that it initiated in 1986.
Being comprised of supporters of Mel King in the 1983
Mayoral campaign, the GRNA was not receptive to the Flynn
administration in the first place. Now with a legal suit
between them, the GRNA and the City were deadlocked. It was
not clear how the impasse would be broken.
In addition to the hostile tensions between the
leadership of the City and that of the Roxbury neighborhood,
other voices in the neighborhood began to propose the idea
of the secession of Roxbury from Boston, adding feul to the
fire. Although this idea gained mixed support from within
the Black community, it forced the City to respond to the
issues most ardently felt by Roxbury residents: inequitable
distribution of resources and services among the City's
neighborhoods, racism, the needs for affordable housing and
for jobs and training, etc. The Mandela campaign was
ultimately defeated in a Referendum, but was sufficiently
* David H. Steinglass, "A Balance of Contradictions:
The Dudleyt Street Neighborhood Initiative, a Case Study of
Institutional Protest" (BA thesis, Harvard University, 1989),
p. 62
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alarmed the City to more aggressively avenues of entry into
Roxbury. DSNI became just the opportunity Flynn needed to
gain allies in a generally hostile territory. As Gus
Newport said at the GRNA Annual Meeting in 1989, "We all
understand that the bold effort of the Mandela campaign has
enhanced DSNI's efforts." DSNI's demands to exert greater
control over development in the Dudley neighborhood seem
much more palatable than those of either the GRNA or the
Mandela proponents over all of Roxbury. In addition, DSNI
had the financial backing of the Riley Foundation.
Having scanned the some of the major economic and
political trends in Roxbury as a whole, I now focus more
specifically on the conditions germaine to the Dudley Street
neighborhood.
4. THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD
Several areas had been identified within Roxbury and
North Dorchester as neighborhood sub-areas by the
Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA), the
body that oversaw planning and development at the
neighborhood level. The sub-areas were defined within the
broader Roxbury and North Dorchester boundaries, with Blue
Hill Avenue serving as a major demarcation line between the
two." The Dudley Street neighborhood, in turn, stradled
areas from both Roxbury and North Dorchester.
The Dudley neighborhoood was created to encompass the
residential area both, within three important commercial
nodes (Dudley Square and Upham's Corner,primarily, and Grove
Hall) as well as surrounding the 30 acre vacant land mass in
the middle of this area, which was coined the Triangle
indicated by its shape. Through the Dudley neighborhood ran
the two major transit arteries, Blue Hill Ave., .indigenous
to Roxbury and Dudley Street, indigenous to both Roxbury and
North Dorchester, which also lined either side of the
Triangle.
However, the neighborhood took its name from the the
vein that ran through the "Core Area" of the neighborhood --
Dudley Street. The neighborhood that had been created by
its founders was divided into the Core and Secondary Areas,
indicating priority for the area most ravaged by the effects
of disinvestment. More information about the genesis of the
organization and the boundaries set by it follows in the
next chapter.
The objective features about this area, however,
explain the attention and concern that had grown for the
area. The Dudley neighborhood in Roxbury is only about 1.5
square miles in area and less than two miles from downtown
" "City of Boston Neighborhoods", Neighborhood
Development and Employment Agency, City of Boston, March,
1985.
Boston. One of its most salient characteristics is its
1300+ parcels of vacant land. One-third of these are City-
owned; one-third are also in tax arrears. In fact, over
one-half of the City's inventory of vacant land is located
in the Dudley neighborhood.
Dudley's varied.population of approximately 14,500
includes residents of Black, Latino, Cape Verdean and White
descent. According to 1980 Census data aggregated by the
DAC consultants, the ethnic breakdown within the Core area
of the Dudley neighborhood is about: 60% Black, 27% Hispanic
and 14% White. Cape Verdeans comprise 15-20% of the
population and are included in the Black and Hispanic Census
count. The fastest growing communities since the taking of
the 1980 Census have been the Latino and the Cape Verdean.
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative is a multi-
racial membership organization whose aim is one of
community-controlled revitalization in a neighborhood which
is at once one of Boston's poorest areas as well as one with
tremendous development potential. A strong and vibrant
community, many of Dudley's residents have lived long years
in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, the median income is
about $13,454 in 1987 dollars compared to a Boston figure of
$16,915. About 40% of the residents live below poverty
level.
The preceding passage introduced us to the Dudley area.
We will now turn to the chapter that traces the development
of DSNI and the issues faced at some of the major turning
points.
CHAPTER 3: THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE: CASE
STUDY
In this chapter, I highlight the transformative
junctures in the evolution of DSNI's community planning and
development processes. An analysis of the particular phases
of this process renders a clearer understanding of the
issues and pressures confronting DSNI. Examination of the
actions and resolutions taken by DSNI at these points reveal
the underpinnings of its guiding philosophy, as well as the
adaptations of which DSNI was capable. The guiding
philosophy of the DSNI Board has been that organizing is
part and parcel of development; that residents of the Dudley
neighborhood must be able to defend the interests of their
various communities, the unity of which can only be obtained
through concensus-building and organizing.
I have distinguished the following stages in the
development of DSNI: the genesis of DSNI, its formalization,
its consolidation through organizing, the community planning
process, and the implementation of the Revitalization Plan.
There are certain salient issues that characterize each
stage and they are developed further below. Such a
chronology can only give an approximate idea of the complex
way in which each phase overlaps with the previous one and,
in a sense, subsumes all the previous stages into its
continuing evolution. However, a review of some efforts
initiated by fellow Dudlians prior to DSNI's creation
35
precedes the storyline of DSNI.
The protagonists in the story of DSNI represent many
sectors of the Dudley community and include players from
outside the community. Within the neighborhood, initially,
there were mostly social service agencies, community
development corporations (CDCs) and a few religious
organizations, some of which served a specific ethnic/racial
enclave. Among the participating agencies were La Alianza
Hispana, Cape Verdean Community House, Upham's Corner
Community Health Center. The local CDCs included NUestra
Comunidad CDC, Dorchester Bay CDC and Lena Park. The
religious groups included St. Patrick's Church, St. Paul's
Church and the American Muslim Mission. Residents who later
assumed increasingly important roles represented each of the
four racial/ethnic groups: black, Cape Verdean, Latino and
white. Small family businesses and mid-sized local -
businesses also joined the Board.
Outside the neighborhood the major players are City
Hall under Flynn and later the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, under the direction of Stephen Coyle. Initially,
the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services worked closely
with DSNI. Later, the Public Facilities Department became
the main link to DSNI. The nature of these links cannot be
understood, however, without a look at the predecessors to
DSNI in the Dudley neighborhood.
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ANTECEDENTS TO THE CREATION OF DSNI
Before the formation of DSNI, several efforts to
addrress neighborhood-wide problems in Dudley were initiated
by rather different constituencies. Although neither one
ever came to full fruition each had planted seeds for what
would eventually blossom into a coalition that broadly
united many of the same as well as new participants. These
initial attempts should be seen as smaller dimensions in the
larger continuum of struggle in the Dudley neighborhood,
whose thwarted results rendered its organizers more
experienced, determined and, in many cases, more combative.
The three attempts were those of the Roxbury Neighborhood
Coalition, the Concerned Church of Roxbury and the Jesus
Helps Baptist Church. In 1981, the Roxbury Neighborhood
Coalition was initiated by Thomas Reeves, a faculty member
at the Roxbury Community College, to unite local social
service agencies in facing common problems in Dudley. There
were several impediments to the Coalition's success, largely
proceeding from the lack of commitment of the collaborating
agencies. For one, the agency heads themselves did not
follow up their avowed support with direct and concerned
involvement in the planning meetings, choosing to delegate
their responsibilities to staff. The lack of commitment at
upper organizational levels ensured the Coalition's failure.
In the end, the Roxbury Neighborhood Coalition did not
coalesce far beyond the areas of mutual interest where the
agendas of the individual agencies overlapped.""
Indeed, one cannot reasonably expect individual agencies
to cooperate after a history of activity spurred precisely
by competition with each other. Although such competition,
most often for funding, usually serves to enhance the
agencies' ability to develop programs and provide services
in their particular areas of responsibility, this increasing
specialization renders the agencies all the more incapable
of envisioning a collaborative plan which comprehensively
addresses the needs of a community."'
Another effort by the Concerned Church of Roxbury,
initiated by local church leaders, suffered a fate somewhat
similar to that of the Roxbury Neighborhood Coalition.
Steinglass points out that the individual church groups
failed to see far beyond the interests of their particular
organizations. A further problem he cites is the priority
given by this effort to the perceived spiritual needs of the
community and its resulting inability to give sufficient
attention to the material needs and conditions of the
community.
In the early 1980's another attempt was made to address
some of the problems facing the Dudley area, this time by
Steinglass, p. 24.
' Janet A. Weiss, "Substance vs. Symbol in
Administrative Reform: The Case of Human Services
Coordination," Policy Analysis 7, 1 (1981): 41.
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local parishioners of the Jesus Helps Baptist Church.'*
Because this attempt has often gone unnoticed, and because
it more closely parallels the efforts of DSNI, it will be
given somewhat more detailed treatment. The Church
developed an "open space" plan for the area of abandoned and
vacant land bounded by Blue Hill Ave., Dudley Street and
West Cottage Street, which is included in the Triangle area
that later became the focus of the DSNI revitalization
effort. The Church's planning effort grew out of its
neighborhood preservation activities and programs. As a
result of redlining practices, Church members could not
obtain loans to rehabilitate homes they owned or to buy
homes that they rented. In response, the Church established
a $50,000 funding pool from which local residents could
draw, at low or no interest. Through their involvement in
this in-house church program, residents began to consider
issues broader than those of financing. They began to
grapple with the larger problems of developing the open
space, and of organizing themselves into a body capable of
making the necessary development decisions.
The events that ensued characterize the oppressive
relationship that has shaped the community's experience vis-
a-vis City Hall. After consulting residents in the area
about their priorities, their concerns, and their
"* Interview with Paul Bothwell, local resident and
member of the Development Committe of the Board of DSNI.
39
aspirations for the neighborhood, the Jesus Helps Baptist
Church called in the Urban Forestry division of the
Department of Agriculture. This division provided
consulting assistance and generated models of the housing
that the residents envisioned for the vacant land. "A sense
of momentum was starting to grow," remarked a resident."
However, when residents approached the White administration
with their ideas and the models, the City would not even
talk with the group. The same resident noted that the City
showed "sheer disdain" for the neighborhood and its
residents: "What we thought and said simply did not
matter... (The City) said it will do what it wanted to do
when the time came to do it." After concerted efforts to
establish a working relationship with the City were
thwarted, the group lost momentum. "They just plain beat us
to a pulp in the end... It breaks people even worse to get
stomped on than if nothing happens. It was an embittering
experience for a neighborhood that had suffered so badly
already," remarked this resident.
The preceding accounts represent frustrated attempts to
advance changes from the community level in the Dudley
neighborhood. Each attempt was launched by a different
sector of the community: the Roxbury Neighborhood Coalition
by local human service agencies, the Concerned Church of
Roxbury by the local churches and the Jesus Helps Baptist
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*3 Ibid.
Church by a parish of local residents. This last effort is
significant in being the only case in which the residents
themselves initiated the effort, and which got as far as
outlining a plan and presenting it to the city
administration. In the general context of outside threat
and neighborhood disintegration, local directors of
organizations launched another coalition effort in 1984.
1. GENESIS OF DSNI
The genesis stage requires an account of the
circumstances under which DSNI was conceived. Here, the
concept of the "Dudley Street Neighborhood" is introduced
and adopted. A "neighborhood" is created when residents and
agencies normally identified along racial/ethnic lines
rather than along geographic lines. The founding agencies
grappled with the problems which affected them as well as
the coalitions which they formed. These included questions
of boundaries, purpose and membership. As we will see
below, the role of Riley proved to be pivotal in generating
organizational interest and broadening an initially limited
agenda. The different interests of the agency-led effort
and the Riley Foundation meshed conveniently.
DSNI was an outgrowth of the struggles just outlined.
Many of the same agencies, churches and residents later
joined together to form the coalition DSNI grew to be. The
objective conditions of poverty and abandonment that lead to
the above-mentioned efforts were still in place, yet, new
trends were becoming apparent. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, the years of neglect and decay had created
intolerable conditions in Dudley. Many of the residents
sensed the impending danger up ahead. Many of the black
residents were survivors of "urban removal" schemes in the
South End during the 60's; many of the current Latino
residents were also victims of displacement from the South
End and Jamaica Plain, where a wave of gentrification had
swept through in the early eighties. The rate of arson had
increased dramatically once again.3 Real estate agents
were slipping tantalizing notices under people's doors that
made grand offers for their homes. Others were coming
around in person and offering cash up front.33 Gentlemen
with clipboards in business suits and expensive cars were
seen surveying vacant lots. All of these recalled old
block-busting techniques familiar to residents in that area.
All of the above indicators were probably themselves
related to an even broader set of forces -- most
importantly, downtown development. Residents feared that
the ripple effects of downtown development would soon turn
into a wave of gentrification and displacement headed for
"" Boston Arson Prevention Commission, Report to the
Boston Redevelopment Authority on the Status of Arson in
Dudley Square (Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1986).
"" Accounts given to me by residents during the time I
was organizing in the neighborhood.
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the Dudley area.
Later on, the leak to the Boston Globe in early 1985,
regarding the redevelopment of Dudley Station, confirmed
residents' worst fears. There were, in fact, big plans for
Roxbury up ahead. It was clear, however, that the current
residents would not be the ones to benefit from them.
Whether the threat of displacement was real or perceived, a
"seige mentality" pervaded the neighborhood. A well-known
element of successful organizing throughout the world is
precisely the existence of a perceived threat from an
"outsider", which serves as a tremendously binding force.
In light of the long-standing conditions, the imminent
threat of displacement and later the involvement of a small
foundation all contributed to the formation of a coalition
whose mission was self-defense, in a collective neighborhood
context.
During the Fall of 1983, La Alianza Hispana and Nuestra
Comunidad CDC began to plan a Search Conference for February
1984 with the technical support of MIT. The directors of
these two Latino organizations, Nelson Merced and Melvyn
Colon, were recent graduates of the Masters in City Planning
Program at MIT and both were members of the Hispanic Office
of Planning and Evaluation (HOPE), a group concerned with
three major policy areas: health, economic development and
education. Several other members of HOPE had also attended
the program at MIT or taught at MIT. The conections between
MIT, HOPE and the Latino intelligentsia were close.
The planning committee began meeting in November 1983
in preparation for the conference. It consisted of five
members who were either members of the Board or staff of the
two groups. Its project was to resolve the two major
questions of the nature of the neighborhood boundaries and
of conference participation. First, the committee adopted
Nuestra's organizational boundaries, which comprehended the
area where the Latino population was most concentrated,
making up about a third of the population of the
neighborhood. The committee acknowledged the need to draw
on all resident groups and their resident resources in order
to define effective development strategies. However, in
determining the nature of participation, it was suggested
that "a strictly representative cross-section of community
residents might have undermined the Search Conference
design, which is premised on a certain homogeneity or
commonality of interests among participants.""" The
committee finall agreed to focus the conference on the
Latino community. while including representatives of the
other ethnic/racial groups. For the conference, the
committee chose twenty-five participants who were
"stakeholders" in the community and who met the established
criteria for participation. Stakeholders were those whose
* In Search of Community: A Strategic Planning
Conference in Boston's Dudley Neighborhood (Boston: La Alianza
Hispana, Nuestra Comunidad CDC, MIT, 1984), p.12.
interest in the area was experienced through residency, work
or official responsibility. Participation was sought from a
broad network of Latino contacts and from some of the other
racial/ethnic organizations. It promoted a large
representation of community residents and equal
representation of males and females.
The Search Conference was motivated by two issues the
co-sponsors deemed especially relevant for the Dudley area,
especially to Latino residents. First, the founders were
concerned that the growing Latino community lacked a
traditional cultural and economic center. They perceived
the Dudley Street and Upham's Corner areas to be the center
of the Latino population. Second, the sponsors wanted to
promote,
defendable growth whereby the economic and physical
rehabilitation of the neighborhood can be planned and
arranged by community residents; where efforts can be
directed towards promoting development and preventing
speculative growth, and stopping displacement of
current residents by continuing disinvestment or future
gentrification.""
The conference generated valuable ideas about the
future desired for the neighborhood as well as action
agendas and action groups. Much of this project was not
realized in any sustained activity. There were, however,
ideas that did carry over to the coalition-building effort -
- DSNI -- which developed later. The most important idea
was the creation of a constitution for development. Such a
"" Ibid., p. 8.
constitution was seen as "an attempt to reverse the tide of
displacement, disinvestment, negative images and apathy in
the neighborhood. It seeks to promote the bonds that will
promote community viability and create a strong sense of
place."""
In addition, many of the recommendations offered in
response to the problems in the housing and development
area, such as affordable housing, vacant lots and abandoned
buildings, were incorporated into Nuestra's programmatic
strategies.:"' Nuestra had effectively positioned itself to
take on much of the development activity in the Dudley area.
In Spring of 1984, La Alianza Hispana received a site-
visit from two Riley foundation trustees who had been
providing support to the agency."" The trustees were
growing restless. There were no visible results from their
continued support to agencies such as Alianza. As a result,
they began a three-year analysis of their past donation
patterns in order to improve future grant-making decisions.
As one trustee put it, "We felt that Foundation capital was
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 33.
" The Riley Foundation was established in 1972, when
Mabel Louise Riley died. She left $20 million, much of it
bequeathed to charity. In her will, she established a
foundation which donates about $1 million per year to fifty
grantees, most of which are agencies in struggling
neighborhoods. See Richard Margolis, "Will the Patient Live?"
Foundation News.
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not being used effectively."" The Riley Foundation at that
point decided to consolidate its grant giving. It chose to
allocate substantial amounts of money into the Dudley
neighborhood rather than fund many individual, isolated and
dispersed causes. They saw in the Dudley neighborhood the
potential for making a difference in neighborhood progress
by helping to create a "bootstrap coalition." The same
trustee made a further point: "We come from a very
conservative, reactionary point of view.... Big government
does not work.... [If this succeeds] maybe we will have
proved our point.""* An entity, namely DSNI, was to be
created to receive the funding and to carry out a long-range
planning function and manage the flow of funds in the
neighborhood.
The Riley Foundation committed $2 million to DSNI over
five years. The Foundation, however, did not want to have
DSNI labelled as a Riley Foundation "project". The
revitalization effort would require other players, such as
the Ford Foundation. The Riley Foundation saw itself as the
catalyst." In the Fall of 1984, Merced called a meeting of
a broad group of local agencies, including the Roxbury
Multi-Service Center, WAITT house, Upham's Corner Health
"7 Interview with Robert Holmes, trustee of the Riley
Foundation and attorney at Powers and Hall, Boston.
'4* Ibid.
Ibid.
Center, Denison House and Lena Park CDC. The trustees of
the Foundation knew that if they came to the first meeting
the directors of the local agencies would certainly show."*
Indeed, agency directors readily attended the meeting.
Holmes remarked about the agencies: "Although they Leach]
have a different clientele, [they also share] a common
thread -- they are entrpreneurial.... They asked the same
questions as start-up businesses.""
At the meeting, Merced presented the idea of creating
an organization that would be charged with overall plannin
for the neighborhood in an effort to control development and
to attract investment that would benefit the current
residents. The proposed structure of DSNI was a coalition
of existing agencies and CDCs. Its function would be that
of a planning body rather than a developer of housing or of
a provider of social services. This appeased the concerns
of some of the participating organizations, because under
this plan DSNI's role would not encroach upon those of any
of its member organizations.
Riley's support of this effort spurred interest in
fellow agencies, for its presence "implied that the
Foundation [was] willing to commit substantial funds to the
Ibid.
* Ibid.
neighborhood.""' To the agencies this translated into
continued, if not increased, financial support of their
ongoing activities. Financial support to DSNI would be
contingent upon its broad-based agency membership.
First, the Latino organizers expanded the organizational
representativeness in the structure. "Within the first few
months we knew something different had to happen. The
situation required a multi-ethnic, multi-racial
collaborative among the agencies", Merced recalled.** Next,
the agency-led effort expanded its ranks to include and be
guided by residents, as explained in a later section. The
concept and structure of such a "community-based"
organization went through many transformations before taking
its final form: a multi-racial, resident-dominated
coalition. To ensure that the effective evolution of the
organization, the Foundation contracted the mediating
assistance of Bill Slotnik of the Community Training and
Assistance Center. Slotnik shared the Foundation's concern
for a broader agency coalition. This would be the only
concern that the Foundation insisted upon. Throughout the
rest of the process, it chose quite deliberately to "remain
passive.",4
Norman Boucher, "From Death to Life in Dudley", in The




The goals of the organization were rooted in the need
to defend the neighborhood's residents and its turf in a
proactive manner. The goals developed were:
1- to organize the residents of the neighborhood in
order to enable them to advocate on their own behalf;
2- to create a comprehensive plan of development for
the Dudley neighborhood;
3- to gain control of the vacant land in the
neighborhood.
The agencies and CDCs were concerned with preserving
the neighborhood, but in doing so they were also assuring
their own organizational preservation. The "neighborhood"
comprised their target areas, that is, their geographical
jurisdictions as well as the residential locus of their
client base. This led to some internal debate within the
broader group of agencies, which then finally agreed to
adopt Nuestra's boundaries as those of DSNI, with some
enlargements. The most significant one was the inclusion of
the Orchard Park Housing Development. Also added to the
Core area was a secondary area to bring the target areas of
other agencies into the framework (see Appendix 1).
Although organizational behavior predicts that agencies will
act in their own best interests, as pointed out by Weiss,"
the self-interests of the founding agencies were called into
question at the first community meeting announcing the
'* Weiss, "Substance vs. Symbol," 43.
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formation of DSNI.
2. FORMALIZATION OF DSNI
The transition from the genesis to the formalization of
DSNI was marked by a crisis in which residents of the
neighborhood contested the legitimacy of the organization,
which was dominated by agencies at the time. The salient
issues in this stage are the participation aand
representation of residents in the context of an effort
touted as "community-based". In this stage, the rganization
is formalized through the election of a Board, the
incorporation of the organization, the hiring of staff and
the opening of an office. During the planning phase when
DSNI was conceived and structured, the agencies provided
stability (and in the eyes of the powers that be) legitimacy
to the effort." They had organizational resources, like
staff time, copying machines, meeting space, which they put
forth freely in order to get this effort off the ground.
However, their hegemony was disquieting to residents on
February 23, 1985, at the community meeting.
The goal of the meeting was to weld the community into
a single constituency in defense of itself. However, a
great chasm between agencies and residents apppeared. The
fact that the founding process was initiated among agency
* Interview with Peter Medoff, Director of DSNI, 1984-
early 1989.
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directors and dominated by a Latino presence led to outright
protest at the first community-wide meeting. At this
meeting, the objectives and structure of DSNI were proposed.
About 200 residents -- Black, Latino, Cape Verdean and White
-- were in attendance. The Riley Foundation provided
translation equipment in order to ensure understanding and
involvement. The provision of the equipment only confirmed
the Foundation's commitment to including a broad cross-
section of the community.
Several black residents, together with some white
residents, challenged the process, believing it not to be
participatory or representative. Che Madyun, a resident who
later became a three-term president of DSNI, recalled her
feelings at that meeting:
They kept saying the community was going to be
involved... but where was the community participation?
... If the community's going to be involved, why are
there going to be so few community residents on the
Board? I raised my hand and told them this is not a
community process."'
At this point, the agencies immediately realized that they
had made a major mistake in assuming that agency-controlled
was synonymous with community-based. They understood that
they could not count on the support of the residents without
first opening the process of planning for a revitalization
effort and structuring the organization that would oversee
" Norman Boucher, "The Death and Life of Dudley: A
lesson in urban economics," The Boston Globe Magazine, April
8, 1990, p. 41.
that effort to include the residents themselves. Without
resident participation in the conceptual and planning phases
of the organization, the residents questioned its validity
as a community-based effort. The residents wanted to speak
for themselves rather than have their interests represented
by others. Merced remarked, "They resented the fact that
once again they had not been involved from the very first.
They were right.""*
Members of the community reopened debate about
boundaries and questioned the role of the Riley Foundation.
Members of Grove Hall CDC, a black CDC, were particularly
angry that the secondary area reached but did not include
Grove Hall. The CDC's director claimed that DSNI was
nothing but "a front for a Hispanic takeover" of the
neighborhood. His opposition remained adamant but his
aggression turned away many people who had initially
listened closely to his words.
In addition, other residents questioned the
Foundation's role in the "community-based" effort. Bob
Holmes, one of the trustees who had been on the site visit
to Alianza, was conspicuously out of place at the meeting,
with his blond hair, blue eyes, wire rimmed glasses and
business suit and tie. Residents voiced angry suspicion
about a white foundation coming into the neighborhood:
** Nelson Merced, Director of La Alianza Hispana, in
Boucher.
"What business do they have calling elections in our
community?" they asked."*
It was imperative at this time to unify, centralize and
control the meeting in order to salvage the effort and move
forward. Concessions were made immediately and a consensus-
building process ensued. This is one early instance of DSNI
playing the role of the mediating organization for the
various bodies within the community -- a role which it was
to play throughout its existence. Slotnik proposed
restructuring
the Board to include more residents, and holding elections
to the Board after restructuring. Holmes responded to the
skepticism regarding his role by saying that he did not come
to tell anybody what to do; that whether this succeeded or
not would not affect him directly as he lived in the suburbs
and had no personal stake in this; and that it was -up to
the members of the community to make things work.""
Those who attended the meeting publicly agreed at this
juncture to reorient rather than to abandon the effort
altogether. A joint committee of residents and agencies
agreed to work on restructuring the Board in order to have
it better reflect a "community-based effort". Che Madyun
remembered that the meetings were productive and set the
tone for the way business would be carried on from that
Margolis.
Holmes.
point forward: "People respected what everyone else was
saying.... I had never been in that position before."""
The new Board grew to a 31-seat body of which residents
represented at least 51% of the members. Residents now held
twelve seats (three per racial/ethnic group) as opposed to
the original four slots. The other sectors maintained their
members constant: five Core area social service agencies,
two Core area CDCs, two Core area small businesses, two Core
area religious organizations, one city official, one state
official, and two at-large appointees. The only other
changes included the addition of two slots from the broader
business community and two from the non-profit organizations
in the secondary area (see Appendix 2).
On March 7, 1985, a second meeting was called which was
attended about as well as the first. The new governing
structure was approved. Then, in mid-April, Dudley
residents held elections for the first Board of Directors.
They elected Fadilah Muhammad, an Afro-American Muslim
resident, and Nelson Merced, director of Alianza, as co-
chairs.
Despite changes in the structure of the- organization,
the goals remained constant. The original goals of
community and turf protection as well as management
continued to be appropriate to the new structure. This
coalition of residents, agencies, businesses and churches
Madyun, quoted in Boucher.
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proceeded to establish an organization that would organize
local residents, develop a plan for the neighborhood and
obtain control of the vacant land. The organization became
operational when it secured office space and hired staff in
the spring of 1985. Once the organization had the official
sanction of the community, a publicly elected Board and
office space, it needed official standing. With the help of
Robert Holmes, who besides being a trustee of the Riley
Foundation was also a corporate lawyer, helped DSNI draft
by-laws and obtain non-profit, tax-exempt status. His
continued involvement with DSNI pro-bono legal counsel as
well as with contacts to the corporate world. DSNI
subsequently drafted its first proposal to the Riley
Foundation requesting $60,000 for a planning grant. Having
received it, 'they were ready to embark on their mission.
3. CONSOLIDATION THROUGH ORGANIZING
During the rest of 1985, DSNI set out to establish
itself in the neighborhood by increasing membership among
all its constituencies -- especially among residents,
although also among community agencies, the small and larger
businesses and the religious organizations. After the
legitimacy of the organization was challenged and refounded
on a broader base which gave residents preeminence on the
board, the goal of the next phase was to consolidate at the
base by making its legitimacy operational through grassroots
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organizing, so that residents could witness the potential
for obtaining results from collective mobilization. The
issue at this juncture became the representativeness of the
organization. In order for DSNI to be truly a "community-
based organization" that advocated on behalf of the
interests of the residents of the Dudley area, DSNI had to
earn the support of the diverse residential population.
DSNI had to conceptualize strategies based on power rather
than powerlessness. It had to win small but attainable and
significant victories, enabling residents to see the
potential of their collective efforts. The sense of power
that came, for example, from getting the neighborhood's lots
cleaned up translated later into the power to envision a new
future for Dudley and then to actually outline a blueprint
for what that should look like --DSNI's Revitalization Plan.
The organization was being built at the base, capacitating
residents to later carry out the planning and
implementation.
The multi-cultural diversity which was shaping the
structure of the organization had to be reflected in the
staff and in concrete actions. Organizers were hired with a
view to representing the various ethnic/racial groups.
Staff and residents also produced a multi-lingual newsletter
in English, Spanish and Cape Verdean Creole. In addition,
one of DSNI's first acquisitions was translation equipment,
which was used at every meeting. Each of these actions
affirmed the identity of each racial/ethnic group within the
growing coalition.
Inevitable tensions developed in the course of
organizing residents to exercise their collective power and
assert it through a neighborhood-based organization like
DSNI. Among the principal tensions was that which persisted
between the agencies and the residents on the Board. Medoff
remarked,
A lot of the agency representatives saw residents'
involvement as a communications process -- the
organization would create a plan and there would be
regular meetings where people could hear what was going
on... I thought it would be harmful to start putting
together a plan if the neighborhood wasn't strong
enough yet to feel control over what was going to
happen.e5
In addition to this internal tension was the external
tension between the neighborhood and the City, which had
been conditioned by a history of chronic abandonement or
displacement. The tension was characterized by moments of
confrontation and followed by periods of cooperation with
the City around different issues. Residents were not lulled
into complacency after the City cooperated with their
legitimate demands for better city services. Rather, their
perennial mistrust of City Hall was the basis of their
continued organizing activity. However, as examined later
in the evolution of DSNI, the tension between confrontation
and cooperation intensified as the relationship between DSNI
" "The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative," Community
Economics 19 (Winter 1990): 9.
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and the City was formalized in the implementation stage.
At first, organizing gave priority to the most winnable
pressing needs. First, organizers identified the issues of
most concern to individual residents as well as neighborhood
associations. Residents wanted cars towed, lots cleared,
local recreational areas maintained, additional police
presence in the neighborhood and more surveillance of drug
activity, enforcement of zoning regulations, and enforcement
of housing and health codes. Organizers created block
associations where they had not existed before and
coordinated the ones already in existence. Then, residents
and organizers began planning and waging campaigns that
unified a fragmented neighborhood and created a mechanism
for people's voices to be heard and for demands to be met.
As a result of the pressure brought to bear by residents,
the City responded to these initial demands by allocating
resources to the Dudley area. For example, the City
increased the towing of abandoned cars and the cleaning of
vacant lots. The Flynn administration was especially
responsive during those first years. Not only was DSNI in
its early stages and gathering momentum, but Flynn was also
initiating his first term after a campaign centered on
responsiveness to "the neighborhoods," and could more freely
allocate resources as he saw fit.
Out of close to home quality-of-life concerns DSNI
organized campaigns aimed at fostering change on several
different fronts. The neighborhood fabric was regenerated
by unifying people and sub-neighborhoods living in isolation
of another and yet facing the same problems. Also,
resources allocated and services delivered to the Dudley
areaneeded to be improved dramatically. Whether it was the
"DON'T DUMP ON US" campaign -- to stop the illegal dumping
of debris on vacant lots -- or the "TAKE A STAND OWN THE
LAND" campaign -- to obtain eminent domain designation from
the City, the intent and the results were the same: to bring
diverse people together around a common problem, to gather
political power through effective mobilization, to apply
pressure on the responsible entities, and to bring about
visible changes and in this manner engender powerfulness out
of powerlessness on a neighborhood-wide level. Since the
"DON'T DUMP ON US" campaign was an early case of this
process at work, it will serve as an example of the initial
methods used by DSNI.
The "Don't Dump On Us" Campaign
The Dudley neighborhood has served as one of the City's
prime dumping grounds for decades due to the illegal
operation of local waste disposal companies and illegal
dumping on vacant lots. The situation impacted the
neighborhood physically and psychologically. Residents often
remarked that so long as people dumped on Roxbury, Roxbury
was always going to be a dump. Having identified illegal
dumping as an issue of major concern, the organizers brought
together residents from across the neighborhood to clean-up
the image of Dudley. "Don't Dump On Us!" became the
rallying cry for renters, public housing tenants from
Orchard Park Housing development, one of the most distressed
public housing developments in Boston, and homewoners alike.
This issue cut across all ethnic/racial lines as well as
socio-economic lines.
The Campaign had a strategic importance. In addition
to attending the issues of health and safety, neighborhood
beautification and image enhancement, the Campaign also
focused attention on the issue of underutilized and overly
mistreated vacant land, thus preparing the groundwork for
discussion about its possible future uses. This kind of
issue would keep residents connected to the long-term
process of planning for and developing the lots. The
Campaign had three components. First, DSNI organized a large
summer Clean-Up, whose purpose was to actively involve
residents in making their neighborhood a more pleasant place
to live. Second, the Campaign was made into a continous
effort and an on-going municipal commitment to get all the
lots in the neighborhood cleaned-up and fenced off. Third,
the Campaign was also aimed at getting the illegal waste
disposal companies out of the neighborhood.
The first summer Clean-Up in the Dudley neighborhood
created tremendous excitement among participating and
observant residents because of its magnitude. Residents and
organizers had established clean-up locations throughout the
neighborhood and corresponding teams of workers. In
addition, the Department of Public Works
and other city divisions committed their trucks and cranes
for the large scale lots. Residents clamored in amazement
that they "had never seen so many garbage and dump trucks
roll down the streets of this neighborhood in (their) entire
lives!" The Clean-Up set a precedent for what was to become
a yearly event and celebration.
Early in his term, the Mayor publicly vowed to get all
the vacant lots in the city cleaned-up. DSNI capitalized on
this promise by pressing to have the City allocate resources
proportionally to the needs of the Dudley neighborhood.
Dudley had a larger concentration of vacant land than any
other neighborhood across the city; Dudley collected a
disproportionate amount of abandoned cars on its streets;
Dudley was the only neighborhood in which illegally
operating waste disposal companies existed and continued to
exist because of unenforced zoning regulations. Although
the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services agreed to
prioritize the vacant lots in the Dudley area for cleaning
and poling, the residents and organizers continued to
pressure the City to close down the waste disposal companies
or transfer stations."" This effort, which took the form of
a demonstration in the Fall of 1985, achieved the desired
results: the closing of four illegally operating transfer
stations. This effort is explained in greater detail below.
Individually, residents had repeatedly made official
complaints to the City, as well as to the waste disposal
companies directly, all to no avail. DSNI organized tenants
from the Orchard Park Housing Development as well as
surrounding residents to demonstrate outside the doors of
these companies. The "Don't Dump On Us!" campaign
exemplifies precisely how an existing set of conditions
afforded the opportunity for various constituencies within
the neighborhood to be unified, through organizing, to close
down the transfer stations despite the class and
racial/ethnic differences among them. Residents directly
affected, like Orchard Park tenants -- both black and Latino
-- and nearby Cape Verdean homeowners, joined together with
other Dudley area residents to fight the source of many
health-related and blight-producing problems in the
neighborhood. The Orchard Park tenants, who lived next to
the facilities, were exasperated with the early morning
rumble of garbage trucks and were also made sick from the
"" Transfer station is also a term that applies to a
waste disposal company because garbage is brought to this
location to be separated, compressed and prepared for transfer
to the landfill.
putrid stench of garbage during hot weather. The Cape
Verdean and black mothers, who owned homes nearby, were in
despair over the mosquito and rat bites, and resulting
infections, their children received. In addition, other
residents were tired of the trash that littered the area.
Although separated by language, class, ethnic background the
residents found common ground for effectuating action.
Together they planned the demonstration and a march to
various dumping sites throughout the area.
The demonstration and march in the Fall were successful
in bringing out close to 100 parents and children with signs
and banners, in stopping the garbage trucks from entering
the facilities, in making the companies cease to operate on
that day, in bringing out every television station and
several papers to cover the story and in forcing the City to
take expedient action. Most importantly, the protes-t
succeeded in closing down four illegally operating waste
transfer stations. The Department of Health and Hospitals
and the Inspectional Services Department, under pressure
from Mayor Flynn, padlocked their gates permanently. Flynn,
who locked on of the gates himself, was more actively
supportive than his staff." In addition, Inspectional
Services and PFD cleaned and placed poles around the vacant
lots to close them off so as to prevent vehicles from
dumping "free of charge" rather than legally at $90 per ton.
* Medoff, in Boucher, op. cit.
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This demonstration was important in that it brought
Orchard Park tenants together with Cape Verdean, black and
white homeowners in a joint effort. One of the major
problems facing Orchard Park is that it is isolated --
physically, socially and psychologically -- from the rest of
the Dudley community. Much of the crime, drug-dealing and
violence in the area is thought to occur inside the
development itself or emanate from it. Residents throughout
Dudley hold negative stereotypes about Orchard Park tenants.
It is commonly said, "If Roxbury is considered a dump,
Orchard Park is considered a hell-hole." Bridging this gap,
at least during this campaign, was a significant step.
This campaign was a step forward not only in organizing
residents, but also in establishing a new relationship with
the City. The coalescing of Dudley residents through DSNI
around campaigns such as this gave them a more powerful
voice in the ears of City officials. It not only enabled
residents to be heard and to be taken more seriously, but
also helped different city departments, with jurisdictions
over different services, to better coordinate their
provision of services. Inspectional Services Department
officials often remarked how much easier it was for them to
work with a community group that prioritized and coordinated
grievances. It was in the interests of both DSNI and the
City to ease the bureaucratic process involved in getting
complaints answered.
Early campaigns such as this one increased the pressure
on the City administration to reform its history of neglect
with regard to Roxbury, and the Dudley neighborhood in
particular. Confrontation was a first, and necessary,
step to cooperation. The Flynn administration was forced to
improve, if not initiate, badly needed services to the
Dudley community. A working relationship with DSNI evolved.
DSNI regularly supplied information to the corresponding
department about locations of abandoned cars, lots that
needed to be poled off, and the like. This relationship
worked to the benefit of all sides. For the community, it
served to raise morale and produce results. For example,
people began to envision Dudley as "a better place to live"
(a phrase coined at this time and still summoned as a sort
of motto by the residents cirrently involved in DSNI's
efforts). The City, on the other hand, through its joint
efforts with DSNI, could now point to the beginnings of a
record of service in one of the most devastated areas in the
city -- an area which the City had traditionally neglected.
The initial struggles and victories of the first eight
months of 1985 established DSNI's organizational strength
enabling it to take on the process of long-term planning
for the Dudley area. Although organizing around immediate
problems affecting the neighborhood continued actively, as
we will see, the primary focus of DSNI became the creation
of a development plan with residents, businesses and
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agencies of the Dudley neighborhood. In addition to
beautifying the area, the cleaning of vacant lots also
spurred talk -- much of it angry and despairing -- about
what needed to be done with all the open space that was now
cleared. Planning for the open space, among other
neighborhood issues, now became the order of the day.
4. THE COMMUNITY PLANNING PROCESS
Building on the momentum of local successes, DSNI
inaugurated a nine-month planning process in the summer of
1986. This stage presented the Board members and the
organizers with new challenges in terms of their respective
roles. DSNI had assumed the new role of a local planning
body. How was it going to carry out a comprehensive
participatory planning process that actually reflected the
will of a diverse body of Dudley residents? How was DSNI
going to keep mobilizing residents as it entered the more
technical/professional stage of planning? What roles would
Board members and general members play in this process? And
then how would the plan become the commonly accepted
blueprint -- by residents and the City -- for development
in the Dudley neighborhood? The DSNI Board maintained that
organizing the residents was necessarily the means by which
to secure residents' involvement and control of this
neighborhood planning effort. DSNI understood that the plan
needed to be representatively inclusive of the various
sectors of the Dudley community in order to be a genuine
reflection of a diverse community's consensual will. DSNI
also recognized that residents had to "own" and promote the
plan in order to have it be recognized as a testament of
Dudley residents' determination to see their neighborhood
revitalized in a manner that benefitted them in the end.
The consensus building around a common vision which
residents shaped and committed themselves to could only be
achieved through community organizing. Community
organizing was the foundation for the planning process,
according to DSNI, which insisted that planning for Dudley's
future was misbegotten without the residents' direction and
that organizing the residents was meaningful only if its
purpose was to empower them to carry the revitalization
effort forward. The organizers focused their activities on
creating resident planning committees which outlined
priorities around different areas of concern in the
development of the neighborhood. The organizers in addition
continued to organize residents around issues of immediate
concern to them.
Appreciating the need for technical assistance to first
elicit the residents' vision of a renewed neighborhood and
then to translate this vision into a workable plan, DSNI
sought independent planning consultation. Yet, how could
Dudley residents, through DSNI, proceed to control the
planning process? As mentioned before, resident control of
the Board was obtained early in the formalization stage,
granting residents a leading voice in directing the
organization. Then, empowering the residents, developing
internal leadership, and inspiring resident participation --
all of which consolidated the residents' political clout --
were to root the planning process in the Dudley citizenry.
Also, control by the residents and the DSNI Board of the
consultant hiring process afforded DSNI more control over
the planning process. They set criteria for selection and
chose to suit their priorities.
The Board outlined the hiring process to be followed
and the criteria for selection. Two local foundations, the
Riley Foundation and the Hyams Foundation agreed to pay for
the consulting fees and the Board issued a Request For
Proposal (RFP) on July 21, 1986 that outlined requirements
of the planning team and scope of the planning process. The
process paralleled that of public agencies, which also issue
bids for contracts. DSNI was looking for a minority-owned
team with a track record in community planning efforts. The
four major components of the plan were to include land use
planning, housing, economic development and social services.
The RFP emphatically required community participation in the
planning process. The Plan would necessarily "directly
(reflect) the priorities of the residents and organizations
in the neighborhood" and "educate the community about the
issues being addressed and recommendations being
proposed.""
In the course of selecting the consultant team,
inherent tensions surfaced on the Board, mirroring some of
those at the community level. Based on the different value
placed upon different qualifications, some of the residents
and agencies supported different teams. It was relatively
simple to narrow the choice down from an initial pool of
fifteen submitted proposals to nine which were seriously
considered for the contract. The final decision laid
between two firms, each of which offered DSNI valuable and
yet different strengths. DAC International, a Washington-
based firm, clearly outlined a process for community
involvement and decision-making throughout the planning.
The proposal of a local firm, Stull and Lee, was strong in
its technical foundation, emphasizing the schematic and
physical design aspects of a plan. The Board support seemed
to have fallen along resident/agency lines, with residents
clearly supporting the DAC process-oriented proposal and
several of the Latino agency heads supporting the more
product-oriented proposal." Although there was some
discussion as to the advantages and disadvantages of hiring
an outside firm, the Board ultimately chose DAC, feeling
more comfortable with a firm that clearly weighted the
"" The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
Revitalization Plan: A Comprehensive Community-Controlled
Strategy, DAC International, September 1987, p.2.
" Steinglass, p.53.
importance of community participation in the planning
process. Although it appeared that DSNI was sacrificing
strong technical and design features for alternative
planning methods, in fact, DAC later subcontracted out to
Stull and Lee some of the design features of the plan, in
recognition of this firm's superior qualifications in this
respect.
As agreed upon in the contract with DSNI to accurately
reflect the community's vision and to educate the residents
during the planning process, DAC conducted extensive surveys
and working sessions with members of the Board and of the
community. DAC sought to gain a sound understanding of the
development problems and opportunities facing the area as
perceived by those who lived and worked there. DAC
corroborated the assessments of Board members -- gathered
through personal interviews and a Board workshop -- at
subsequent resident committee meetings and larger community
meetings.
The question arose as to how to bring the various
sectors of the community into this planning effort. A
different approach was needed for the residents, for the
community agencies and for the businesses and for the
residents. DAC planners sent a survey package to fifty one
social service agencies known to provide services to the
Dudley area, some of which were located within the
neighborhood while others were not. Sixteen, 31%,
responded. The servuys were followed by interviews of a
handful of the respondents. Some agencies were very
reticent to disclose information, especially regarding
finances. As for the businesses, DAC held a series of
interview with small business owners and other members of
the Dudley business community.
Residents participated in various ways: through a
consumer survey, at large community convocations and in
smaller working committees. Community-wide meetings were
held at the beginning, mid-way and at the end of the
planning period. Residents were notified through extensive
flyering, public notices, radio announcements, newpaper ads,
mailings and door-knocking. Member organizations also
reached out to their consituencies. Yet, smaller working
committees, which grew out of the large community-wide
meetings, met regularly. These smaller planning committees
were created around each of the four main issues: land use
planning, housing, economic development and social services.
Residents could be part of as many committees as interested
them and each committee included DSNI Board members.
The general concerns voiced at the large meetings were
then teased apart in the working committee sessions. DAC
consultants used a focus group approach in which 10 to 15
residents gathered around a specific issues to discuss it in
depth. DAC prompted residents to "story-tell" so as to
glean intricate dynamics about an issue. This often had to
be done with simultaneous translation, so that non-English
speakers could participate at this level of discussion. For
example, where concern existed around the high purchase
prices at local stores, the consultants asked residents to
describe a typical shopping excursion. In the focus groups,
organizers tried to include a representative cross-section
of the residential community in the focus groups. When they
were over-represented by any group, special efforts were
made to recruit members of the under-represented group(s).
For example, the Housing Resident Planning Committee was
heavily dominated by Cape Verdean residents. In this case,
residents were asked if they were maybe more interested in
joining another group instead. Also, other racial/ethnic
groups were encouraged to join.
As spelled out in DSNI's proposal, DAC was bound to
developing a plan that reflected a vision of a transformed
neighborhood which would be defined by new relationships.
The planning process itself was structured to embody some of
the changes in the way residents related to themselves, to
eachother and to outside experts. The residents were the
protagonists and the consultants were the facilitators in
this process. DAC planners came to residents with more
questions than answers. Residents were asked to comment
more than just on the nature of a problem, but also on
possible solutions. Residents were active particpants of
the planning process, rather than passive reviewers of
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options already decided for them.
As facilitators in the process, rather than all-knowing
experts, DAC consultants were able to draw from the
participants not only their frustrations about problems, but
also their knowledge about opportunities in the area. All
told, about two hundred residents participated during the
course of the planning period. The latter formed the basis
for many of the strategies offered in the document DAC
produced in September of 1987, entitled The Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative Revitalization Plan: A Comprehensive
Community-Controlled Strategy. With the completion of the
plan, DSNI's second goal had been attained.
The final plan was presented at a neighborhood festival
that fall celebrating the neighborhood's accomplishment and
marking a historic event. The plan was put up for a vote
and enthusiastically embraced by the two hundred residents
in attendance. Mayor Flynn was among the many attending
supporters and announced the City's official adoption of the
plan, making it the blueprint for development in the area.
The DSNI Plan
The neighborhood blueprint included several strategies
for the integrated development of the Dudley neighborhood.
The strategies centered on three main areas: housing,
economic development and human services. Two principles for
the development of viable real estate alternatives guided
DAC. First was the notion of a "critical mass," that is, a
sufficient amount of new and rehabilitated space needed to
be aggregated in order to affect the existing market or
create one of its own. The second principle was a "tandem
strategy" calling for the simultaneous and coordinated
development of new construction and rehabilitation
activity.
The main elements outlined in the plan include:
1. Creating 800 to 1000 new, affordable units of
housing, and the rehabilitation of 1000 more units;
2. Gaining control over the vacant land;
3. Anchoring the development activity in a central
"urban village" which would offer an array of amenities,
including community facilities, retail businesses,
neighborhood offices and affirmation of the community's
identity;
4. Creating job-training and employment opportunities
appropriate to the needs of Dudley residents;
5. Enhancing the service provision of human service
agencies and increasing their accountability to residents;
6. Promoting and asserting the cultural diversity of
the neighborhood.
It is helpful at this point to give an overview of the
"' The Dudley STreet Neighborhood Initiative
Revitalization Plan: A Comprehensive Community Controlled
Strategy. Executive Summary, (Boston: DAC International,
Inc., 1987), p. 5.
organizing activities in which the planning process was
couched. A broader view of this sort highlights DSNI's
efforts to continually build its credibility and respect in
order to have the Plan adopted by both the neighborhood and
the City.
Organizing Activities Accompany the Planning Process
As stated earlier, DSNI continued to organize residents
around issues of immediate concern while organizing them
around a vision for tomorrow's Dudley neighborhood. This,
in part, is what kept people connected to the process. DSNI
was working actively to address the issues of today as it
was dealing with those of tomorrow, especially as they
regarded development.
DSNI had, in effect, become the clearinghouse for much
of the development activity in the Dudley area. The
membership had grown to over 800 from 350 since opening an
office and hiring a staff. The membership was comprised of
people whose level of particpation varied depending on their
commitment, time availability, life constraints and the
like. Members included people who attended planning or
general DSNI meetings; people who called the office for
advice or to offer information or volunteer time; people who
belonged to block associations that came into the DSNI
coalition; people who had been long-time activists in the
area; people who were not receiving adequate attention at
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local social service agencies and sought support at DSNI.
Also, included were local merchants, church ministers and
parishioners and the main social service agencies and non-
profit development corporations in the area.
As DSNI grew in size and ascended in importance in the
neighborhood, it began to coordinate activities and
development efforts so that these would be beneficial to
residents in the short and long term. In light of the
planning effort underway, the DSNI Board also sought to have
on-going development be consistent with the goals of the
plan.
Several factors contributed to DSNI's success in
positioning itself as the clearinghouse for on-going
development in the Dudley neighborhood especially as long-
range planning was taking place. Just as clearing the
vacant lots led people to thinking about the development
that should follow, deciding about the benefits or dangers
of specific projects brought people further into the long-
range plans of the neighborhood. First, DSNI was already
recognized for having assembled into a working coalition
(with funding) many important sectors in the neighborhood.
As previously mentioned, DSNI convened long-term and
respected activists, the major agencies, block association
members, merchants and church groups. These disparate
participants were committed, as a representative body, to
advocate on behalf of the interests of Dudley neighborhood.
Unprecedented in the history of the neighborhood, residents
and agencies as well as churches and merchants had brought
their collective resources and strengths to bear on outside
forces in order to preserve the Dudley neighborhood.
Second, DSNI's seminal organizing activities at the
beginning seemed to have engendered confidence in arriving
at collective decisions that translated into political
influence to affect change. Tis became clearer as residents
increasingly sought information and/or support from DSNI in
sanctioning or opposing particular development projects in
their back yards. Residents in Dudley had grown highly
suspicious of most development activity over the years since
it usually transgressed authorized land uses. In Roxbury,
the zoning of contiguous areas for light industrial and
residential uses created serious problems of social and
physical well-being for residents in the area. Residents
had a history of resisting the encroachment of waste
disposal or truck leasing operations into the neighborhood.
Now, as members of a neighborhood-wide coalition, these same
residents could count on the support of greater numbers of
fellow residents as well as agencies, merchants and churches
in their efforts to combat local problems.
For example, a resident of a neighborhood association
called the office seeking DSNI's support in opposing a
zoning variance application to locate an industrial
operation next to an elementary school. The staff
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investigated the developer, the conditions of the project
and the request for a zoning variance. The hazards seemed
to far outreach the benefits to the local school-age
children. Moreover, the residents did not want any more
light industrial operations located so near the school and
homes. DSNI helped organize a protest inside the
construction site and prepared residents for testifying
before the Zoning Board of Appeals.
Another significant event that enhanced DSNI's
clearinghouse role as the BRA's decision to update Boston's
1956 Zoning Code in the Summer of 1986. Since, the rezoning
process is lengthy, the BRA established the Interim Planning
Overlay District (IDOD) in several neighborhoods, which
provided interim planning standards that would eventually
facilitate the comprehensive planning and rezoning of all of
Roxbury. Under the framework of an IPOD, and through the
Roxbury Neighborhood Council (RNC), Roxbury residents
decided their priorities for land use in their neighborhood.
The IPOD was intended for two years initially, although it
is still in place. During this time, all development had to
receive an Interim Planning permit before proceeding. DSNI
and RNC, as mentioned earlier, had reached an agreement that
RNC, of which DSNI is a member, would defer to DSNI in
matters of development and other decisions in the Dudley
area. DSNI coordinated meetings in which residents
participated in making decisions about compatible zoning
patterns. This participation was a continuation of the
residents' participation in overall neighborhood planning
decisions.
The fourth reason that DSNI could effectively broker on
behalf of the Dudley neighborhood vis-a-vis the City is that
the City itself recognized DSNI as the representative voice
of the Dudley area. DSNI had struck a fine balance between
using methods of confrontation and cooperation. The City
had come to respect how effectively DSNI organiz.ed a
campaign and mobilized people. The Dudley neighborhood was
becoming an organized constituency in the Roxbury area.
Through DSNI, the Dudley residents pressured the City into
line with its demands. This gave residents confidence that
their organization could achieve concrete results. The
City, in turn, considered DSNI the legitimate voice of the
Dudley neighborhood. As one city official said, "Who can
really bring out the numbers in that area anyway? It's DSNI
time and time again."
DSNI's Relationship to the City
While DSNI challenged the City's authority, it also
invited the City's participation into a partnership. DSNI
and the City each have been indispensable to the planning
process -- as they continue to be to the overall
revitalization process -- because each has contributed
leverage and legitimacy to this undertaking. DSNI has
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harnessed the collective human and political capacities of
its residents to carry the plan to fruition -- that is,
their vision, knowledge, commitment, resourcefulness, sense
of history, and political influence through action. In
effect, residents could move a project forward or halt it in
its track. DSNI has been able to structure neighborhood
needs in a way understandable to the City. The City, on the
other hand, has brought institutional, financial and
technical resources as well as the political will that has
permeated the Mayor's office down through the different
departments. The Director of the Public Facilities
Department commented, upon completion of the Plan, that:
It was so impressive to see people who have every
right to be angry and in despair come in with a
concrete plan and vision for the future. It was a
train you wanted to get on. It would have been immoral
not to."*
An agreement was reached between DSNI and the City
which was testimony to this growing relationship and to the
respect that DSNI had gained from the City. The City agreed
not to sell any of the land it owned in the Dudley
neighborhood during the planning process. The DSNI Board
hoped, although no assurances were given, that this land
would later be facilitated to DSNI during project
implementation.
Although the political clout had been amassed at the
* Lisa Chapnik, Director of Public Facilities
Department, quoted in Boucher, op. cit.
81
neighborhood level and the political will had been secured
at the municipal level, DSNI nevertheless capitalized on
every opportunity. The succeeding paragraphs reveal
additional aspects of how DSNI approached the city.
According to DSNI's Executive Director for the first four
years, Peter Medoff, maintained that in dealing with City
Hall, it was first necessary for the Board to clarify its
immediate goals and objectives and then deal with the
highest level bureaucrats. "You go straight to the top,
after having done your homework," he used to say. As DSNI's
first director, Medoff, who is an organizer with a planning
degree, was instrumental in shaping the rapport between DSNI
and the City. He had extensive experience in institutional
networking and applied those skills forcefully.
As Director of the organization, he was obliged to
carry out the policy decisions of the Board. While some
Boards merely rubber stamp the edicts of the director, the
levels of accountability at DSNI were far greater. The
director reported to the DSNI Board, which debated issues
and reached decisions by consensus. Broader policy issues
were brought before the membership to be decided upon in an
open forum.
In establishing relationships with various city
department heads and city officials, Medoff consciously
travelled through downtown offices accompanied by different
Board members. This served three purposes. First, it
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signalled to city officials that they could not just deal
with Medoff, who was white and male, but that they had to
also deal with black and brown, male and female, english and
non-english speaking people, who as a Board were the
ultimate decision makers. For this reason, a direct flow of
information was important.
Second, Medoff's actions underscored the point that the
Board ultimately had more clout and power than the director
of the organization. Being the ultimate decision-makers,
after consultation with the community residents over policy
matters, Medoff's role was, in effect, communicator and
networker.
Third, the opportunity for residents and others on the
board to establish contacts and working relationships with
city officials directly helped demystify City Hall. It also
equipped them with knowledge and experience to do so again
and in even more hostile environments, with or without
Medoff.
The City found DSNI's decision-making process tiresome
at times, although meritorious nonetheless. Before
finalizing policy decisions, the DSNI Board consulted, as it
still does, the larger Dudley community. Although the Board
may have taken a position on a matter subsequent to furtive
discussion, any stance was open to modifications, dismissal
or ratification by Dudley residents at community meetings.
The community decision set the course for the Board and
staff to follow. During the planning process, such protocol
involved and informed residents so that they could make
educated decisions. In addition, this practice inspired
greater trust in the planning process. Through the planning
process, DSNI tried to establish a foundation of people who
could ultimately push the revitalization process forward.
Having met its second goal with the creation of a
community-based Plan, DSNI next focused its attention on
attaining the third goal it had been established to meet:
gaining control of the land in order to prevent speculation
and to implement the plan.
As we have seen in the progression of DSNI's formation,
each stage subsumes the ones prior to it. We observe in the
implementation stage the same phenomenon. The salient
aspects of each of the previous stages, organizing and
planning, are also incorporated in the implementation stage.
5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN
Implementation of the Plan presented DSNI with a
complex set of issues. The Plan had laid out a framework
for development. DSNI now had to begin the task of
realizing the neighborhood vision. As the planning and
implementation became increasingly technical, how would the
DSNI Board maintain the momentum? How would the Board
members keep the membership involved in the increasingly
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complicated development decisions? How would DSNI balance
the dual roles of an organizing and planninf organization?
How would DSNI maintain a balance between the various
components of the Plan? Finally, what did it mean for DSNI
to enter into a formal partnership with the City after
obtaining eminent domain designation? These are but some of
the more salient questions which faced DSNI at this juncture
in its evolution.
The Eminent Domain Process
The Board of DSNI believed that controlling the vacant
parcels was necessary to curb the development activity that
the residents did not want, like speculation, and to foster
the development that residents did want in the neighborhood,
like that embodied in the the Plan. How could the land be
controlled by the residents of Dudley? What strategy would
make most sense given the fact the vacant land was a
checkerboard of interdispersed City-owned and privately-
owned land?
A brief review of the Plan's foremost recommendation
refreshes our understanding of the relevance of the land
question. The Plan stressed the importance of creating a
critical mass that would turn around the physical, social
and economic conditions of the Dudley neighborhood and the
market. The Plan suggested that implementation begin with
development of the Triangle, that is the area encompassing
most of the vacant land and the area situated in the heart
of the neighborhood. Such development entailed the
construction of housing as well as a town commons, community
facilities, commercial space, recreational space and open
space. New housing would bring increased numbers of
residents; new consumers would spur commercial activity;
more jobs, better social services and additional
recreational space would increase the quality of life in the
area.
DSNI sought the help of Community Builders, a local
consulting firm that provides technical assistance to
neighborhood groups, to effectuate the implementation of the
Plan. The first question was whether to start development as
soon as possible, which meant in a piecemeal fashion on
City-owned land, or to consolidate the vacant land and then
develop it accordingly. DSNI thought it not practical nor
desirable to "nibble" at development. Instead, the expected
advantages of DAC's critical mass approach guided the
objective of consolidating the vacant land.
The second question was how to consolidate the land.
DSNI considered several means to consolidation, however. One
option was to have the City consolidate the vacant land
through foreclosure and allow DSNI to oversee its
development, while the City retains its ownership. Another
option was to have the City consolidate the land through
foreclosure and then either lease it or turn it over to
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DSNI, which would then oversee its development. Yet another
option arose -- to seek eminent domain designation and
assemble the land itself.
The Board rejected the foreclosure options. In light
of the City not having demonstrated a standing record of
expedient tax foreclosures, the DSNI Board felt that relying
on this process would retard the implementation process and
as a result jeopardize the residents' continued involvement.
Maintaining momentum at the neighborhood level was important
after the long planning process. Waiting for the City to
move the parcels might have undermined the residents'
patience and trust in the process. Also, Mayor Flynn was
nearing the end of his first term. In the event of a
possible, although unlikely, upset DSNI wanted to control
the land regardless of who occupied the Mayor's office.
The struggle for eminent domain authority illustrates,
as have previously mentioned examples, how factors converged
and contributed to DSNI's eventual designation. DSNI was
instrumental in creating some of those factors or at least
the conditions in which those factors emerged. For example,
DSNI prepared itself technically, organized an effective
land control campaign, and networked among high level
officials, as explained before.
Other opportunites had presented themselves, however.
Stephen Coyle demonstrated very progressive thinking in
suggesting that DSNI consider eminent domain designation.
Also, Mayor Flynn focused increasingly on the issue of city-
owned vacant land and made it an important element of his
affordable housing agenda. At about the time DSNI released
its Plan, the Public Facilities Department, at Flynn's, was
taking inventory of all the publicly-owned vacant land. The
Mayor wanted to know how much land was availble for the
construction of affordable housing, and the Dudley
neighborhood was found to have the highest concentration of
vacant city-owned land.** This situation was aggravated by
the fact that much of the city-owned land was interspersed
with privately-owned parcels.
The survey also demonstrated that the City was, in
effect, the largest "landlord" in Boston. At his re-
election in 1987, Flynn promised to dispose of all city-
owned parcels by the end of his second administration." At
a time when the real estate market had begun to slow down,
Flynn's intent was to "jump start" it again." His
administration aimed to do this through the creation of new
programs, the most important of which was the Buildable
Lots-747 Program. The City's new impetus to increase
scattered-site housing development worried the DSNI board,
as this would assuredly counter the comprehensive
*' Barry Berman, Public Facilities Department
" Ibid.
" Peter Medoff, quoted in ibid..
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development plans outlined by the Dudley residents in their
Plan. The idea of seeking eminent domain designation as a
way of addressing the land question was arrived at
independently by DSNI in early 1988 through its consultants,
and later that spring by Stephen Coyle."'
The year between adoption of the Plan in the fall of
1987 and the conveyance of eminent domain authority in the
fall of 1988, was spent doing research, generating
neighborhood support, wooing the Mayor's support and waging
a major campaign. When the idea of eminent domain was first
suggested, members of the Board and members of the community
both reacted with serious suspicion. The mere mention of
"eminent domain" evoked images of "pillage", "rape" and
destruction of poor and black communities, especially during
the days of Urban Renewal." However, the Board members
soon realized that eminent domain was a tool and that the
effects of its application, as with any tool, depended on
who used it and how it was used.
DSNI explored the possibility of seeking eminent domain
power with the help of a top real estate Boston firm which
had been providing pro-bono legal counsel to DSNI. The firm
recommended that DSNI pursue eminent domain designation from
the BRA board. Careful review of Chapter 121A of
" Interview with Peter Muchenbach, Community Builders,
March 30, 1990.
* Ibid.
Massachusetts General Laws revealed that such designation
could be granted to private "urban development
corporations", including charitable corporations which
developed affordable housing. Eminent domain had been
previously granted to private developers for major projects
who, as a result, benefitted from the corresponding tax
provisions, as in the case of the Prudential Center."
The members of the Board themselves became convinced
that eminent domain was a promising means for gaining
control of the private vacant land in the neighborhood. The
Board and other members of the community communicated that
conviction through the "TAKE A STAND, OWN THE LAND"
campaign. DSNI educated, organized and rallied residents
around the need for community control over the vacant land
in order to counter speculation and to implement the Plan.
Residents at first were skeptical of the merits of eminent
domain, as the Board had been initially. DSNI held seven
informational community meetings throughout the neighborhood
which were attended by hundreds of residents. DSNI Board
members posed a case for pursuing eminent domain designation
and responded to residents' questions, doubts and concerns
about it. The Board clearly defined the scope for use of
eminent domain power: it would apply to 15 acres of
privately owned land in the heart of the neighborhood where
most of the vacant land was concentrated. The Board assured
* Peter Medoff, in Boucher, op. cit.
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them that not only would there be no "clearance" of any
sort, but land owners would be adequately notified of the
process and offered a "fair market price" for their
property. While generating a base of understanding about,
and support for, eminent domain designation within the
neighborhood, DSNI also sought the backing of City Hall.
DSNI ironically enjoyed, from early on, the undaunted
support of the BRA's director in its pursuit of eminent
domain designation. "Coyle turned his own bureaucracy
around"." However, DSNI had to slowly win the support of
the Mayor and the Public Facilities Department, in
particular. Coyle had blithely suggested, on a visit to the
neighborhood one day, that DSNI apply for eminent domain
status. He offered the suggestion after inquiring about
DSNI's progress and after being told that the issue of land
tenure needed to be settled before implementation of the
Plan could proceed."" On the other hand, the Public
Facilities Department was not so forthcoming, at first. PFD
deemed such a petition unnecessarily drastic for addressing
the land debate. Officials there also questioned whether the
perceived threat of speculation was as great as residents
feared." Nonetheless, Flynn's support grew and with it,




community-based development effort in Roxbury -- an
important consideration for Flynn -- from a planning stage
into an implementation stage.
The "TAKE A STAND, OWN THE LAND" campaign finally won
the official endorsement of the Mayor, who made his support
public at a neighborhood land control rally of over 200
residents in the fall of 1988. He followed the endorsement
with a letter of support to DSNI which accompanied the
formal application to the BRA Board for 121A corporation
status. Flynn wrote,
The authority vested in a 121A corporation -- to take
and own land -- represents an unprecedented
opportunity in this city to control the destiny of your
community... It is clear that the key to successful
redevelopment of the Dudley neighborhood is the control
over private vacant property... I believe.. .that by
using the 121A powers as an effective legal tool, the
community and the City will ensure that comprehensive
revitalization of the Dudley area takes another major
step forward. Your group has the capacity, wisdom and
vision to handle this task, and I am pleased to be able
to support your application to the BRA Board."*
The public hearing before the BRA Board proved to be a
point at which the residents and the Mayor brought their
respective leverage to bear. Flynn's support buttressed the
will of bus loads of Dudley residents who came to the public
hearing before the BRA Board on Oct. 13, 1988. About 25
testimonies were heard, most of which were favorable ones by
residents and supporters. However, there were a handful of
7 Mayor Raymond Flynn, Letter of Support to DSNI for
121A Application to Boston Redevelopment Authority, September
28, 1988.
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testimonies against DSNI's application. There were self-
identified speculator property owners who claimed that their
interests were at stake. Either they had been waiting for a
long time for the property to increase in value in order to
sell later or they had bought land recently. One opponent's
parcel was not even within the DSNI area, let alone within
the 15 acres being considered for designation. At the BRA
Board meeting that followed, Flynn exerted pressure and
flagged comments begrudging a favorable decision designating
eminent domain authority to "foreigners", to people who were
"not even Americans", a reference to the Cape Verdean and
Latino populations of the Dudley neighborhood." The Board
then took the matter under advisement before announcing its
decision a month later.
The Minority Developers Association (MDA), a group of
mostly black developers formed to advocate for increased
minority participation in development activity in Boston,
was another interest group that DSNI had to negotiate with
extensively in its pursuit of designation. The MDA had come
of age around 1986 and perceived having greater access to
development activities, particularly since Flynn's recent
election. It appeared, at least to them, that they would be
the natural inheritors of development opportunities in
Roxbury, especially on the neighborhood's vacant land. The
MDA considered DSNI "a bunch of communists" for attempting
Muchenbach, Boucher
to gain community control of land in Roxbury." According
to a BRA official, the MDA was concerned that DSNI was "a
vocal organization with a white director. They were
suspicious of the process. There were not enough safeguards
on paper to assure them opportunities [in the development
process]"."
DSNI, as a partial response, created a non-voting seat
on the DSNI Board for the MDA, which to this day remains
empty. However, the issue was far more complex than one of
representation. Actually, the fundamental differences laid
in their respective definitions of development
opportunities. DSNI had clearly stipulated that it sought
at minimum a 30%, if not 50%, minority-owned business
participation rate in all construction as well as
professional and technical service contracts. A bidding
process for developer selection would provide competitive
opportunities for interested parties, as it had done in the
selection of the planning team DAC. The real issue was that
the development opportunities to be provided by DSNI were
different than those sought by the MDA. Most of the housing
to be built on the Triangle would be low and moderate income
units. The MDA was interested in more lucrative ventures
than those DSNI would be offering. In the end, the MDA's
* Herb James, former Housing Specialist, Quincy-Geneva
Community Deveplopment Corporation.
* Andrea D'Amato, Project Manager, Boston Redevelopment
Authority.
conerns were appeased by virtue of realizing that this
measure was not against their interests in the final
analysis. Their support was won over.
The BRA Board's final decision officially marked
another moment of convergence among the varying interests of
different parties. The citizens of the Dudley neighborhood
maintained that acquiring eminent domain authority was a
means by which to limit speculation and to implement the
Plan in a manner that served the current population. For
the City, eminent domain facilitated development in the
Dudley area. On November 10, the BRA Board approved the
application and officially granted eminent domain authority
to DSNI. Interestingly, about a month later, the Chairman
of the Board, Robert Farrell, resigned. In its decision,
the BRA stated that evaluation of the existing conditions in
the Triangle area of Dudley and the expected benefits from
DSNI's program for revitalization rendered designation
consistent with the provisions of the General Laws and
exemplified sound public policy.'" The Resolution granted
the Dudley Neighbors, Inc., a subsidiary of DSNI,
designation as an Urban Redevelopment Corporation charged
with the power to acquire and lease 15 acres of privately-
owned vacant land. This land in combination with 15 acres of
publicly-owned vacant land would be joined to create 10
" Resoulution of the Boston Redevelopment Authority
Regarding the 121A Application of the Dudley Neighbors, Inc..
Nov. 10, 1988.
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parcels slated for thr development of 500 units of low to
moderate income housing. The BRA stated in the memorandum
of agreement that it felt that Chapter 121A designation
would capitalize on DSNI's revitalization initiative by
converting haphazard development activity into a coherent
community-based, multi-site, land-assembly process. For
this very reason, both DSNI and now the BRA deemed 121A
designation as the only efficient vehicle by which to
address the severe problems confronting the Triangle Area.
The Triangle was the area over which eminent domain
could be exercised because it beleaguered by many unique set
of problems. When considered jointly, these problems
necessitated a coordinated solution. The Triangle had a high
concentration of both publicly-held land and privately-owned
vacant land, of parcels in tax foreclosure, of parcels held
by absentee owners and of parcels unsuitable for housing
development due to their small sizes. DSNI proposed, and
the BRA agreed, that this situation could foreseeably be
reversed in a timely and efficient manner by enabling DSNI
to exercise eminent domain powers.
DSNI at this point entered a period of organizational
flux. Gus Newport, former two-term populist mayor of
Berkeley, California, became the new director of DSNI.
Newport brought to the organization a wordly political
understanding.
In the Spring of 1989, DSNI began detailed planning for
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the Triangle area. Comunitas, a local planning firm, was
hired to help create a site-specific plan for housing,
community facilities and open space. In the course of three
community meetings, about two hundred residents deliberated
and reached consensus on the type and location of housing
they wanted to see built in the Triangle. Residents voiced
a preference for mostly two-family homes and some town
house-style units. Locations for two community facilities
and several gardens and tot lots were also identified.
With this build-out plan in place, pressure mounted
from all sides to start the actual development of the units.
On the one hand, years had passed and residents wanted to
see new housing, not more plans. The Flynn administration,
on the other hand, was seeing its second term come to a
close, with many unfulfilled promises for new housing.
DSNI was also facing an organizational crisis. It had
recently lost its development specialist and human services
coordinator. A new director, Gus Newport, had only recently
assumed the leadership of the organization. The staff was
now reduced from an all-time high of twelve down to only
four. Without a development staff person, the Development
Committee of the Board was meeting on a weekly basis in an
effort to assimilate the new responsibilities that
accompanied eminent domain designation. It grappled with
broad issues, such as raising funds to purchase vacant land;
determining the first development site; and designing
criteria for developer selection. The Committee was also
overwhelmed with the legal details of setting up a land
trust, obtaining clearance for construction from the
Department of Environmental Management, and the like.
Tensions only worsened between DSNI and PFD. DSNI felt
unduly pressured at a time when it was short staffed to meet
the rushed schedule of the Mayor's administration. PFD felt
that DSNI needed to place greater emphasis on product rather
than process. These tensions characterize this last period
of DSNI's development, through to the present day.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF DIALECTIC TENSIONS WITHIN THE DUDLEY
NEIGHBORHOOD
In the preceding scheme of the chronological
development of DSNI it was not possible to give an adequate
account of the complex and interwoven set of relations which
are part of all the stages of planning and organizing. The
new relation between the City and the neighborhood described
in the previous chapter is only the most general and
noticeable of these. Indeed, one might most clearly discern
the novelty of DSNI's approach precisely in its ability to
promote a growth in the number and kinds of relationships
among previously separated groups -- and in this way to give
new dimensions to the concept of neighborhood.
The most effective means of gaining insight into what
is truly singular about the case of DSNI, therefore, is to
describe the problems that accompany the creation of these
new relations, as well as the attempts made to resolve them.
Some of these relationships we have already been
covered and will be alluded to again. Others receive
initial treatment below.
1. DIALECTIC TENSIONS
Although the initial suspicions of a "Hispanic attempt
to take over the neighborhood" have been assuaged, tensions
persist within the organization and within the neighborhood,
at all levels and from all directions. Internally, strains
exist among different sectors of the community and among
divergent pressures. External forces, which are met with
resistance, also impinge upon the Dudley neighborhood.
One of the main sources of tension historically has
been between residents and local community-based groups in
the area. These agencies include both the social service
agencies as well as the non-profit community development
corporations (CDC's). Residents have felt ill-served by the
social service providers and detached from the housing
development work of the CDC's. The residents perceive the
service agencies to be investing inordinate amounts of time
and energy chasing public and private dollars in order "to
stay in business." Residents believe the agencies' efforts
to be self-serving and at the expense of meaningful service
to the population in whose name the funds are sought.
Other factors that contribute to the heightened agency-
resident tension are the structure, personnel, philosophical
orientation and funding sources of the agencies. The
agencies have a hierarchical organizational structure in
which decisions are made at the top and are communicated
down through the ranks. Also, the personnel often does not
live in the neighborhood. As one resident remarked, "They
work a full day, but by 5pm, they're out the door and have
forgotten we (the residents) even exist."
In addition, the agencies part from the notion that
their roles are indispensible to the well-being of the
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community. They see themselves as the holders and conveyers
of precious resources that community residents cannot do
without. As the conferring agent to passive recipients, the
agencies sustain a relationship with the community based on
dependency rather than self-sufficiency. Residents, in
turn, end up feeling disempowered by the mode of service
provision and mistrustful of the agencies' underlying
motivations.
Lastly, agencies often solicit money for programs that
are "fundable" rather than for those that satisfy greater,
and as yet, unmet needs. The result has been that agencies
duplicate administrative and programmatic services. This,
in part, explains why residents feel that agencies respond
more effectively to funders than they do to people in the
neighborhood.
Compounding the resident-agency tensions are the intra-
agency dynamics. Territoriality, competition and distrust
characterize the relations among service groups. They
target a particular service to a given population,
geographic area or both. Agencies stake claims on their
targets and then solicit public and private monies to render
those services. The groups become highly protective of the
services they provide as well as the people and area they
serve in an attempt to outdo other organization. The groups
pit themselves against one another while scrambling for
funds. This breeds enmity rather than harmony among groups
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trying "to do good" for others.
The dynamic among church groups themselves parallels
the dynamic among agencies, except that the former compete
for people's souls rather than people's human service needs.
Just as agencies have not traditionally coordinated delivery
of services, neither have the churches in their efforts to
meet parishioners' needs. The Church has important social
and spiritual roles in each of the cultures of the Dudley
area. The various churches stand to serve their
parishioners all the more productively if they join efforts
and resources.
Another set of foreseeable tensions exist between
residents and merchants of the area. The few existing
businesses furnish important services to the local
community. Grocery-store owners, especially, provide a
convenient, culturally-based and essential product. The
problem is that the local businesses often charge much more
than the larger chain stores for their merchandise due to
overhead and other costs. Not surprisingly, the mostly low-
income residents of Dudley resent having to pay so much more
and a love-hate relationship results. The tension between
the residential and the business communities came to a head
during the planning process when residents underscored the
need for supermarkets in the area. The grocery-store owners
reacted with concern fearing this may jeopardize their
businesses.
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The Dudley neighborhood has its share of ethnic, racial
and class-based rivalry also. Latinos claim that Cape
Verdean homeowners will not rent out apartments to them and
will only rent out to other Cape Verdeans; Blacks feel that
Latinos are invading the neighborhood in ever greater
numbers; Whites feel that everyone else is a newcomer;
residents of all ethnicities fear and scapegoat Orchard Park
Development tenants. Although ethnic and racial antagonisms
continue, some sense of neighborhood unity has been achieved
through the multi-cultural festivals, the ongoing organizing
and the planning and development work. The ethnic and
racial diversity of the neighborhood is one of its greatest
assets.
All of the above-mentioned dynamics are internal to the
neighborhood and are manifested on the Board. However,
another series of pressures emanate from the outside. Now
that DSNI is on a development track with the implementation
of the plan, the organization is facing a lot of pressure
from its partner in this process -- the City -- to deliver
some concrete results soon. The Mayor wants to gain some
political territory and wants to see housing built in
Roxbury quickly. Rumblings about seeing something concrete
come out of this planning process are also being heard from
within the neighborhood. Whereas the City could forsake
part of the process in order to expedite the product, DSNI
is committed to and bound by a process, which is regarded
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with equal importance.
Another important factor, which the neighborhood can
ooly marginally affect, is the market. DSNI was formed at a
time when speculation in Roxbury was rampant. Buildings and
lots were turning over weekly. Getting the land "off the
market" was a priority, otherwise development would be
exhorbitant and assuredly result in displacement. The
market had gone soft when eminent domain was finally
conferred, and some speculate that this, in part, explains
why DSNI ever received designation.
2. DSNI'S STRUGGLE TO BALANCE THE TENSIONS
DSNI has addressed these very tensions through its
structure and organizing. It will be important to assess to
what extent and how well DSNI has dealt with these tensions.
Staff of DSNI have organized at all levels in the community.
At the onset, the organized individuals and agency
representatives to run for the the Board of DSNI. The Board
currently has 27 active members, most of whom are local
residents who are representative of the various ethnic
enclaves in the area. Merchants, community organizations
and local religious groups also constitute membership on the
Board. As explained above, each of these parties comes to
the organization with different experiences and interests.
By bringing the participants together into a working
coalition, however, DSNI created a forum where these often
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conflicting concerns are aired and addressed. The parties
have joined efforts to plan and work for Dudley's
redeVelopment. The process has generated on-going dialogue
and has engendered trust. The different participants
continually gain a better understanding of each other's
motivations and needs.
DSNI also organized the resident base through
neighborhood associations, community gardens and youth
groups. Concretely, some important channels for reaching
people have been St. Patrick's Church, which holds services
in Spanish, Portuguese and English and certain social
service agencies, which serve different ethnic communities.
Different ethnic communities have been mobilized through
different channels at different times. Many of the leaders
of the Cape Verdean community in Boston live or work in the
Dudley area. The first Cape Verdean organizer at DSNI is
now the Mayor's liasion to the Cape Verdean community in
Boston. The person who broadcasts a Cape Verdean radio
program -- which every Cape Verdean listens to -- is a
resident and store-owner in the neighborhood.
Organizing among the Latino residents, whose
participation in DSNI is not proportional to their numbers
or presence in the Dudley area, continues to pose a
challenge for DSNI. There are several established Latino
businesses as well as church groups in the area, Latino
involvement in the DSNI process has not been as strong as
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that of other ethnic groups, although it has recently
increased some.
In addition, DSNI's other organizing activities include
fostering solidarity among the businesses (Dudley Merchants
Association), church groups and social service providers,
who are both cooperating informally more often. As a result
of the human service planning process, agencies -- very
reluctantly at first -- began to share their concerns, their
problems and their visions. They found that they had much
more in common than they thought, which helped them overcome
some of their defensiveness. They found understanding,
rather than disdain, from their peers when they shared some
of their vulnerabilities and their problems. One of the
major achievements of the DSNI process has been the
qualitative leap from competition to cooperation among
members of the various sectors and between sectors
themselves. This is not to say that agencies no longer
compete for grants or that CDC's are no longer territorial,
however, all of them are invested in cooperating to achieve
goals that are larger than their immediate organizational
ones.
The perennial mistrust of the City continues,
especially on the part of the residents. They have too many
sore wounds that have yet to heal for them to enter into
partnership free of skepticism.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Economic changes since World War II, and more recently
with Boston's downtown renaissance, have dramatically
altered labor markets, demographic patterns and development
trends in the city. Boston's downtown boom rendered it one
of the convention capitals on the eastern seaboard in the
early eighties. However, the cumulative effects of such
changes have adversely affected Boston's poorer communities.
Especially affected have been the black and Latino
communities in Roxbury.
The accelerated development activity of the early
decade created tremendous pressure upon the remaining open
space. Roxbury, only 1.5 mi. from the city center, was not
only close but very rich in an increasingly scarce resource
-- land. The greatest amount of vacant land anywhere in the
city was concentrated in the Dudley neighborhood.
Seeing the external threat of displacement and the
internal threat of dissolution, residents and local service
institutions mobilized in self defense. Among their other
choices were allowing the invisible hand of the market to
act fireely, leading to their inevitable displacement, or
residents and agencies could have pursued an avenue of total
self-determination like that proposed by the Mandela
campaign. Instead, the Dudley residents and agencies
responded by attempting to control the future of their
107
neighborhood. They created a blueprint for development and
obtained control of the vacant land in the neighborhood.
The ways in which DSNI managed the problems confronting
it provide important lessons that may be successfully
applied to other community revitalization efforts. Although
the lessons are multiple, they can best be learned if they
are accompanied by an understanding of the conditions which
made the individual episodes of this case possible. It
makes little sense to attempt to extract a recipe-like model
for community revitalization from a case with such a complex
and unique setting and history. Equipped with an
understanding of the converging factors which have
contributed to DSNI's successes and failures, one can apply
this framework to other revitalization efforts.
One way of perceiving this convergence is to view the
Dudley neighborhood as a grouping of different bodies, each
with its own interests and agendas. These in turn are
subjected to the agendas of larger institutional and
societal forces. An organizing effort aimed at changing the
prevailing social, economic and political conditions in a
community necessarily produces a conflict of such interests,
within and outside of the neighborhood. The force of good
will and the conviction of a higher purpose alone do very
little to bring these individual bodies to willingly
sacrifice their objectives in the interest of the greater
good. Instead, the organizing group is that much more
108
effective when it recognizes the existence of these local
agendas and takes them into account in developing its
programs. At the same time, these programs can provide the
incentive for the individual bodies to approach their goals
within the larger framework of a plan for the community. In
this way the programs builds upon the points of convergence
among the various and often conflicting agendas. Individual
benefits translate into community benefits, and vice versa.
Then, finally, a true community consciousness can grow.
A sense of community can be born from collaboration, as
exemplified by reduced tensions along race and class lines
on the Board of DSNI, although such mutual respect is not
paralleled in the larger Dudley community. An emerging
sense of "community", no matter how fragile it may seem,
must not be taken for granted. Communities disintegrate in
the absence of continual maintenance from both within and
without. The challenge facing DSNI is to continually build
upon this sense of community.
The conditions of destitute poverty and growing
violence and despair can lead communities to abandon hope
altogether, or to direct increased violence inwardly, as
well as outwardly. However such conditions can also lead
communities to take mobilized action aimed at obtaining some
control over the forces affecting them. The residents and
organizations of the Dudley neighborhood have assumed
responsibility for changing the conditions under which they
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live and creating a different future for their neighborhood.
As a result, city planners and officials have come to
appreciate the determination and work of the DSNI Board and
membership. At DSNI's Annual Meeting in June 1989, the
Deputy Director of the Public Facilities Department said to
the public its efforts were about,
the rebirth of your community. We originally came to
your neighborhood to teach...and in reality we've been
taught what community means. Community is not just
housing but also open space and a decent place to
live.. .We are partners on equal footing and have
growing respect for this partnership. We are finding
ways of listening and we are very proud partners of
this community and DSNI.1
Among the many important lessons to be drawn from
DSNI's efforts to date is the importance of allowing and
encouraging people to define for themselves the realm of
possibilities to pursue with respect to their own
development and the means by which to achieve them. As Che
Madyun, the three-term president of DSNI, said:
People are always trying to tell you you're no good.
Everywhere you go, someone's always trying to tell you,
"Who are you to speak up for yourself?" I hear that all
the time, and I'll tell them in a minute to go to hell.
I have a right to whatever everybody else in this
country has, and if you don't give it to me, I'll step
on you and I'll get it!"
The status quo maintains the hegemony of certain
interests. As planners, we are often accomplices to this
' David Treitsch, Deputy Director of the Public
Facilities Department, City of Boston at DSNI Annual Meeting,
St. Patrick's Church, June 21, 1989.
* Che Madyun, quoted in Boucher, op. cit..
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order by being the providers of sound technical frameworks
and plans that supposedly facilitate effective
immplementation of a project. More often than not the
framework offered severely limits the options considered
realistic or attainable. Subsequently, the feasibility of
achieving an objective is determined by a narrowed choice
among pre-established and "rational" possibilities rather
than by the exercise of political influence to create
alternative options. In other words, the way business has
carried on has traditionally set the stage for the way it
continues to be done, with minor adjustments. The Board and
membership of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative have
demonstrated that this order of business simply will not do.
They have, in fact, created options for themselves through
effective organizing which has built on local wisdom and
experience as well as on political opportunity. They did
this by building consensus in a racially and ethnically
diverse community and by tapping into the common junctures
of the various, and often conflicting, agendas of many of
the parties involved -- both within and outside of the
neighborhood.
Skeptics at all levels would never have credited the
Dudley community with the ability to create its own
Comprehensive Revitalization Plan which has become the
official blueprint for development in the area. Few people
outside the neighborhood truly believed that DSNI would ever
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obtain eminent domain authority from the BRA. Even on a
smaller, though just as significant, scale DSNI's
achievements have countered what was thought to be
impossible after so many frustrated attempts -- the closing
of illegal waste disposal companies and the clearing of
vacant lots. All of these are testimony to the ability of
the DSNI Board and membership to find the links between
their agenda and that of other major players, like the City.
In effect, conflicting agendas need not be mutually-
exclusive ones.
There are several other lessons that must be noted
here. People's initial motives of self-interest, which is
ultimately the point of entry for most stakeholders, does
not necessarily determine the course of development to
follow. As seen by the genesis of DSNI effort, the
interests of the Latino agency heads in their own
institutional and cultural survival did not ultimately
determine DSNI's evolution into a broad multi-cultural and
multi-sector effort.
The two founding Latino organizations initially
expanded their ranks through the prodding of the Riley
Foundation, whose interest was to fund an effort that was
broad-based, althogh agency led. The Riley Foundation was
going to be making a substantial financial commitment to the
neighborhood and wanted the institutional framework to be
inclusive. This financial commitment, in turn, provided
112
sufficient institutional incentive to bring together the
various agency directors, in a way that the Roxbury
Neighborhood Coalition was never able to do.
Another significant lesson is the importance of finding
issues that in and of themselves create sufficient momentum
to carry people into longer-term political action. The
cleaning up of vacant lots, for example, had the dual
purpose of creating immediate and visible changes in the
topography of the neighborhhood as well as generating a
groundswell of discussion about how the vacant should be put
to use. Resident involvement in the clean-ups led to their
involvement in the planning of development for those lots,
and then to the struggle for control over them. All of this
required continual organizing.
Also of grave importance to those who advocate
thoroughly democratic practices is the establishment of a
consensus building framework for makings decisions. DSNI
has had to lay a framework which enables the various
interest groups in the neighborhood to participate in the
decision-making process and has organized many diverse
constituencies so that they may be informed in making those
decisions.
To understand the converging forces bearing upon a
community group trying to revitalize its neighborhood also
requires viewing the community in a historical continuum.
As stated earlier, DSNI is an outgrowth of the years of
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struggle by residents whose failures and successes are
embedded in and have shaped the evolution of DSNI as an
organization and in its program for development. It is
critical to see DSNI's victories today as having their
origins in people's struggles yesterday and serving as a
basis for those of tomorrow. Residents do, in fact, comment
on struggles in which they participated prior to DSNI's
having initiated similar ones. For example, they mention
having participated in clean-ups and the like before DSNI
came along and organized them. Organizers acknowledge that
indeed those residential efforts helped set the conditions
for DSNI to have become what it is today. Residents must be
recognized for their previous struggles.
DSNI attempts to do this not only by acknowledging but
more importantly by celebrating publicly collective
struggles and collective victories. For example, the
release and subsequent adoption of the Plan occurred at a
neighborhood festival and was honored by the Mayor's
presence. Also the "TAKE A STAND, OWN THE LAND" rally,
which preceded the BRA Board hearing, was an anticipated
victory in the long-fought struggle for community control of
land in the neighborhood. Some of the early resident
struggles may have amounted to no more than localized
efforts to address issues such as the cleaning of garbage-
filled lots. Nevertheless, the successes and failures of
isolated efforts of this sort begged for an approach that
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provided an overarching framework and philosophy of















4.1 Number and Election. The Directors of this
Corporation shall be thirty-one (31) in number and elected in
the first instance by the Incorporator and thereafter by the
Members. The Directors shall be broadly representative of the
community, with no less than four (4) representatives,
respectively, from Black, Cape Verdean, Hispanic and White
cultures. The Board of Directors will include:
Number of Seats Description
12 Community members (Black, Cape




5 Non-profit agencies from the
Health and Human Service fields
2 CDCs from the Core Area
2 Small businesses from the Core
Area
2 Broader business community
2 Religious community from the
-Core Area
2 Other (determined by the Board,
using criteria of racial/ethnic
/age/sex representation, skills
or resources)
2 Non-profit organizations or
groups from the Secondary Area
31
The election of Directors to fill terms which have expired
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